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ARGUMENT 
I. DR. CHAMBERLAIN HAS FAILED TO OFFER ANY SUPPORT FOR HIS 
ASSERTION THAT AN EXPERT CANNOT VIEW CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION UNDER § 78-14-12(l)(d). 
As set forth in Munson's Opening Brief, Munson's principal assertion is that 
regardless of whether the prelitigation documents in question are or are not confidential 
under Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(l)(d), an expert witness like Dr. Jacobs is already 
within the category of non-public persons who can view such confidential documents without 
violating any statutory proscription. See generally Munson Opening Br. at pp. 8-20. In his 
responsive brief, Dr. Chamberlain has failed to directly rebut this central and dispositive 
contention. 
First, Dr. Chamberlain has filed to cite to any statutory language from §78-14-12, the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, any related Utah statute, or even any non-related Utah 
statute that prevents experts from viewing any confidential information in any litigation 
setting. 
Second, Dr. Chamberlain has failed to cite to any legislative history from § 78-14-12 
or from the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act that in any way indicates that the Legislature 
intended to prevent parties from providing the prelitigation documents to their own retained 
experts. 
Third, Dr. Chamberlain has failed to cite to any decision interpreting either Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-14-12 or any other provision from the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act so 
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as to contain such a prohibition. At most, Dr. Chamberlain has repeated his bare assertion 
that the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, 984 P.2d 980, 
somehow compels this result. Doe v. Maret does not, however, indicate that a violation of 
§ 78-14-12 occurred here. As discussed at lenglh in Munson's Opening Brief, see Munson's 
Opening Br. at pp.9-10, 19-20, Doe merely held that § 78-14-12(l)(d) is violated when a 
party quotes from and attaches a prelitigation document to a publicly filed appellate brief. 
Doe, 1999 UT 74 at ^[21. Doe said absolutely nothing about non-public disclosures being 
prohibited under the statute, nor did the decision in any way state, indicate, or even imply that 
a private disclosure of a party's own documents to that party's own retained expert witness 
is in any way prohibited by the statute. Dr. Chamberlain's assertion that Doe prohibited the 
disclosure that occurred here is manifestly incorrect. 
Given the total absence of any Utah authority prohibiting the disclosures that occurred 
here, the only way the trial court's decision would be supportable is if Dr. Chamberlain had 
offered authority from other jurisdictions interpreting the term "confidential" in a way that 
prevented experts from viewing information in a case-which would at least make it arguable 
that the Legislature intended such a result under § 78-14-12(l)(d). Such citation would have 
been particularly necessary given Munson's extensive citation in her own brief to cases 
holding (1) that experts play a vital and necessary role in modern litigation, and (2) that as 
a result, experts must be deemed authorized to view any information that is deemed 
confidential in a case. See Munson's Opening Br. at pp. 12-19. Rather than citing to any 
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contrary authority, however, Dr. Chamberlain instead simply attempts to distinguish these 
cases by noting that most of them involved protective orders. Dr. Chamberlain's Br. at p. 31 
n. 11. This argument presents the classic distinction without a difference. Protective orders 
were necessary in the cited cases in order to first impose a confidentiality status on the 
information in question, and to then dictate the terms by which that confidential information 
would be used throughout discovery and trial. Here, the information in question has already 
been legislatively and judicially deemed confidential under § 78-14-12(l)(d) and Doe v. 
Maret so no protective order was needed to accomplish this end. The relevance of the cited 
authority therefore had nothing to do with the protective order classification aspect, but rather 
with the fact that under each of these orders, all expert witnesses were allowed access to the 
confidential information. This extensive list of authority at the very least supports Munson's 
assertion that, at common law, it is routinely and uniformly assumed that an expert witness 
can view information or documents that have been deemed "confidential." Given that the 
Legislature is presumed to use statutory terms "advisedly," Dr. Chamberlain's Br. at p. 29 
(quoting Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic. Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 
(Utah 1995)), this cited authority strongly supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not 
intend to keep experts out of the loop in medical malpractice cases. Dr. Chamberlain has 
simply failed to offer any authority showing any circumstance where the term "confidential" 
was interpreted any differently. 
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It is not enough for Dr. Chamberlain to simply note that § 78-14-12 renders the 
information in question "confidential" and leave it at that. Instead, given Munson's 
extensive citations to authority on the meaning of this exact term, Dr. Chamberlain needed 
to respond by somehow demonstrating that the term "confidential'" in this context actually 
prohibited the conduct in question. None of his cases or arguments stand for such a 
proposition. As such, this Court should conclude that the term "confidential" in § 78-14-12 
means what it always means, and that violations of the statute only occur when unauthorized 
members of the public are granted access to the protected information. Dr. Jacobs was not 
a member of the public when he received these documents, and he was expressly authorized 
to view the documents by virtue of his status as a retained expert witness. Dr. Chamberlain 
has offered no authority that would compel a contrary result. 
11. DR. CHAMBERLAIN'S ATTEMPT TO OVERRULE DOE v. MARET BY WAY 
OF DISTINCTION SHOULD BE REJECTED BY THIS COURT. 
Rather than addressing the question of experts and confidentiality head-on, Dr. 
Chamberlain instead attempts to create a violation in this case by asking this Court to 
distinguish Doe v. Maret on a number of specific levels. First, Dr. Chamberlain asks this 
Court to draw a distinction between consulting experts and testifying experts, thereby holding 
that only consulting experts can be given access to confidential information under § 78-14-
12. Second, Dr. Chamberlain asks this Court to draw a distinction between documents that 
were prepared for the prelitigation panel and those documents that were simply submitted to 
the prelitigation panel. 
Page 4 of 24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As an initial matter, it should be pointed out that while Dr, Chamberlain couches this 
as being a "failure [on Munson's part] to draw three key distinctions," Dr. Chamberlain's Br. 
at p. 9, Dr. Chamberlain fails to acknowledge that none of these distinctions have actually 
been drawn in any Utah cases. While this Court certainly has the power to draw such 
distinctions if they are not contrary to prior precedent, the suggestion that Munson has 
somehow "failed" by not drawing distinctions that do not actually exist seems strained at 
best.1 
Regardless, a closer look at Chamberlain's suggested distinctions shows that not only 
are they each unsupported under current law, but also that each would have no substantive 
bearing on the outcome of this case even if they were accepted by this Court. 
A. The distinction between consulting and testifying experts is not relevant to 
the actual issues presented and should not be created nor applied by this Court 
in this case. 
The first distinction that Dr. Chamberlain asks this Court to draw is between 
consulting experts and testifying experts. Specifically, Dr. Chamberlain argues that while 
consulting experts should be allowed to view prelitigation materials under the § 78-14-
12/Doe confidentiality scheme, experts who will be called to testify cannot be allowed to 
'This suggestion is further puzzling insofar as Dr. Chamberlain has himself asked this 
Court to reject Munson's own interpretation of § 78-14-12, in large part arguing that this 
Court should not adopt any interpretations that move beyond the strict terms of Doe. See Dr. 
Chamberlain's Br. at p. 18 (arguing that "this Court lacks the authority to overturn Maret," 
and quoting case law for the position that "[o]nly the Utah Supreme Court can correct any 
deficiencies in [its precedent]"). 
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view such materials because they may ultimately be subjected to a public cross-examination 
regarding the documents they have viewed. 
As an initial matter, it should be pointed out that neither §78-14-12 nor Doe v. Maret 
says anything about expert witnesses at all, let alone there being some distinction between 
consulting and testifying experts. Dr. Chamberlain therefore creates this distinction for 
purposes of this appeal. In addition to being unsupported by current law, however, this 
distinction is also contrary to common practice under Utah's litigation rules. Under the rules 
of procedure, parties are not required to even make a preliminary determination regarding 
which witnesses will or will not be called to testify until thirty days after the expiration of 
fact discovery. See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure R. 26(a)(3)(C). If the testifying/consulting 
expert distinction put forward by Dr. Chamberlain were adopted, however, a party would 
have to make this determination with respect to each prospective expert prior to having even 
discussing the case with that expert in their initial consultations. Otherwise, the party would 
run the risk of inadvertently disqualifying the expert from participation at trial by providing 
the expert with the wrong type of information at the outset. If adopted, Dr. Chamberlain's 
seemingly innocuous distinction would dramatically alter the way that experts are used in 
medical malpractice litigation, with this sea-change not being mandated by any statute, or any 
rule, or any case dealing with the Utah Health Malpractice Act. 
Dr. Chamberlain's application of this particular distinction to this case is ultimately 
striking, however, insofar as it represents a key admission on Dr. Chamberlain's part. 
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Specifically, by asserting that consulting experts are allowed to view prelitigation materials 
without violating the confidentiality requirement of § 78-14-12, Dr. Chamberlain is 
effectively conceding that the confidentiality requirement does not absolutely bar subsequent 
disclosure of prelitigation documents to any and all persons. Instead, his argument is that 
under both § 78-14-12(l)(d) and Doe v. Maret disclosure to an expert is only impermissible 
if the expert is going to eventually testify at trial. 
The problem with this argument is that it approaches the question on appeal in a 
manner that is analytically backwards. Rather than directly addressing the question of 
whether a party is authorized to disclose prelitigation materials to its own expert, the 
argument instead focuses on the subsequent consequences of the other party later wanting 
to conduct a public cross-examination regarding that disclosure. As discussed on pages 20-
26 of Munson's Opening Brief, however, this circular, imputation-based argument is based 
on at least three false premises. 
The first false premise is that such a cross-examination would have necessarily 
violated the confidentiality requirement of §78-14-12. As noted in Munson's Opening Brief, 
however, this cross-examination could have been conducted in a non-public, sealed setting, 
thereby preserving the confidentiality of the information. These sort of confidentiality-
protective procedures are routinely employed, as evidenced by the protective order cases 
cited by Munson in her Opening Brief. In such cases, confidential information is routinely 
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discussed and put before a trier of fact without in any way exposing that information to the 
general public.2 
The second false premise is that a party's inability to cross-examine an opposing 
witness about all possible sources of bias is somehow problematic as a matter of law. A 
party does not always have an absolute right to cross-examine a witness about all possible 
subjects. Even where relevant, some subjects are simply excluded from cross-examination 
due to a variety of more compelling reasons (such as the exclusionary rule, an applicable 
confidentiality requirement, or a protective order). Thus, even if it were the case that this 
whole subject were off limits and the cross-examination could not occur at all, this 
prohibition still would have no impact on Dr. Chamberlain's rights in a way that is in any 
way unique or unfair.3 
2Dr. Chamberlain's particular assertion that a closed, non-public examination would 
still not be possible because of § 78-14-12's prohibition on introducing evidence regarding 
the prelitigation "proceedings," Dr. Chamberlain's Br. at p. 26 n.7, is likewise flawed. As 
discussed throughout his brief, Dr. Chamberlain simply wants to cross-examine Dr. Jacobs 
regarding the impact of these documents on Dr. Jacobs' thinking. Given this limited scope, 
it is difficult to understand how this cross-examination would have involved a discussion of 
the "proceedings" of the prelitigation panel at all. Such an examination would not have 
required discussion of prelitigation testimony, the nature of the panel's deliberations, or the 
terms of, let alone the existence of, the panel's actual decision. In all reality, there would 
have been no need to mention that the panel even existed to have conducted a thorough 
examination on this point. 
3Dr. Chamberlain's related argument that preventing him from conducting such a 
cross-examination would violate Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is unfounded. 
Dr. Chamberlain's Br. at p. 25-26. As noted by Dr. Chamberlain in his brief, Rule 26 simply 
requires an expert to provide a "summary of the grounds" for each of his opinions, but says 
nothing about requiring disclosure of everything that a witness has ever viewed that has any 
remote connection to a case. At the end of Dr. Jacobs' deposition testimony in this case, he 
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The third false premise is that a ruling preventing Dr. Chamberlain from cross-
examining Dr. Jacobs regarding his knowledge of the prelitigation documents would have 
had any substantive impact on this case at all. During the discovery phase of this case, Dr. 
Jacobs was deposed by Dr. Chamberlain's counsel. The full text of that sworn deposition 
is attached as an addendum to this brief (and is located in the record at pp. 395-77). During 
that deposition, Dr. Jacobs was able to offer detailed, fact-based support for each of his 
opinions in this case, and in spite of the extensive questioning, he was never forced to 
"parrot" or even refer to the opinions of Dr. Kane or the Notice of Intent. See Addendum, 
deposition pp. 22-72. 
Regardless, this whole cross-examination based argument is ultimately diversionary. 
Specifically, this argument is focused on the consequences of a confidentiality breach that 
Dr. Chamberlain wants to commit, and not on the question of whether Munson actually 
committed a violation of her own. Contrary to Dr. Chamberlain's assertions, the question 
at issue here is not how to cross-examine an expert regarding these matters. Rather, the 
question is simply whether an expert is allowed to view these materials at all in the first 
instance. Dr. Chamberlain simply should not be allowed to impute the consequences of his 
own hypothetical violations onto Munson, and this Court should decline the invitation to be 
specifically stated that he had disclosed and discussed all the bases and grounds for his 
opinion. R. at 378, deposition p. 71. The obvious meaning of this direct statement is that 
though Dr. Jacobs may have viewed other documents or had other conversations relating to 
this case, none of those had any bearing on his opinions. As such, Munson's Rule 26 
obligations were fully satisfied. 
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distracted from the actual legal question at issue by focusing on this non-existent distinction. 
The question here is whether a retained expert is allowed to view the confidential information 
under § 78-14-12 or Doe v. Maret. Dr. Chamberlain's focus on the subsequent effects of 
such a disclosure shoots beyond the mark of this question entirely. 
B. Dr. Chamberlain's argument that there is a distinction between documents 
that were prepared for the prelitigation panel and those that were simply 
submitted to the panel is contrary to the express language of Doe v. Maret and 
should be rejected. 
Dr. Chamberlain argues that there is a distinction between documents that are 
"specifically prepared for the prelitigation panel" (hereinafter "prelitigation documents") and 
documents that only reflect "the underlying facts of the case" (hereinafter "evidentiary 
documents"). Dr. Chamberlain Br. at p. 21. According to Dr. Chamberlain, while the 
prelitigation documents are "confidential" under § 78-14-12, the evidentiary documents are 
not. By drawing this distinction, Dr. Chamberlain asserts that the absurd result of experts not 
being allowed to view such documents as medical records can be avoided. 
The chief problem with drawing this distinction, however, is that it still doesn't solve 
the problem of this case. Specifically, regardless of whether all documents are deemed to be 
confidential under § 78-14-12, or whether it is only the prelitigation documents that are 
deemed to be confidential, Munson has still argued that experts are entitled to view all 
confidential documents relating to a case under both § 78-14-12 and the general law of 
confidentiality. Thus, even if accepted, this proposed distinction literally has no bearing on 
Munson's argument. 
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Even if this distinction did have some bearing on this case, however, Dr. 
Chamberlain's attempt to draw and enforce it here should be rejected because the distinction 
is expressly contrary to the plain language of the Utah Supreme Court in Doe v. Maret 
Contrary to Dr. Chamberlain's assertions, the Supreme Court did not hold that documents 
are deemed confidential if they are "prepared for and submitted to the prelitigation panel." 
Dr. Chamberlain's Br. at p. 19. Dr. Chamberlain's assertion otherwise is simply wrong, 
insofar as the term "prepared for" does not appear anywhere in the Utah Supreme Court's 
opinion. See 1999 UT 74 at | 21 . Instead, the full text of the court's analysis of the 
confidentiality question is as follows: "Today we hold that because the notice of intent serves 
as the basis for the prelitigation panel review, and because it is often utilized as part of the 
prelitigation review, it is part of the proceeding and must be kept confidential." Id. 
Given this plain statement, Dr. Chamberlain's suggestion that a document (such as a 
medical record) that "served as the basis for the prelitigation panel review" and which was 
"utilized as part of the prelitigation review" could somehow be rendered non-confidential 
simply because it was factual or evidentiary in nature is expressly contrary to the plain terms 
of Doe. Dr. Chamberlain's suggested distinction therefore isn't really a distinction at all, but 
is in reality a disguised attempt to overturn Doe's core premise. While Munson certainly 
agrees that the Doe framework should be revised by the Supreme Court if necessary on 
certiorari review, see Munson's Opening Brief at pp. 32-34, Dr. Chamberlain's attempt to 
have this Court accomplish this task at this stage is at best self-contradictory. See Dr. 
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Chamberlain's Br. at p. 18 (arguing that "this Court lacks the authority to overturn Maret," 
and quoting case law for the position that "[o]nly the Utah Supreme Court can correct any 
deficiencies in [its precedent]"). So long as Doe is binding, this Court must accept Doe's 
assertion that documents that "served as the basis for the panel review" and which were 
"utilized" by the panel are confidential. 
It is for this reason that Munson's waiver argument is so crucial in understanding the 
medical malpractice scheme created by Doe. Medical records have long been deemed to be 
both "privileged" and "confidential" under the law. See, e.g.. People v. Caballes, 851 
N.E.2d 26, 51 (111. 2006) (noting that "the confidentiality of personal medical information 
is, without question, at the core of what society regards as a fundamental component of 
individual privacy"); State v. Demarav. 704 N.W.2d 60,66 (Iowa 2005); Statev.Blom, 682 
N.W.2d 578, 617 (Minn. 2004); Jones v. Asheville Radiological Group, P.A., 500 S.E. 2d 
740, 745-46 (N.C. App. 1998). Indeed, these protections are now codified under the federal 
HIPPA statute. In spite of this, courts have routinely held that patients waive such privileges 
or confidentiality protections by choosing to file a medical malpractice lawsuit. See, e.g. 
Jones, 500 S.E. 2d at 745-46; Great West Life Assur. Co. v. Levithan, 153 F.R.D. 74, 77 
(E.D.Pa. 1994). 
In this context, § 78-14-12 says that the "proceedings" of the prelitigation panel are 
confidential, and Doe expressly extends that protection to the documents that were "utilized" 
and "relied" on by the panel. Doe's protections of these documents are presumably for the 
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plaintiff as much as for the defendant, insofar as the plaintiffs notice of intent or medical 
records may contain details that are sensitive to the plaintiff. Thus, what Doe ostensibly does 
is bring harmony to the prelitigation panel's confidentiality rule. Without Doe, a plaintiff 
would theoretically waive her medical privacy rights (at least vis a vis her medical records) 
by submitting her case to a prelitigation panel. Under Doe, however, the confidentiality 
protections afforded to her medical records continue through the prelitigation process, and 
waiver still only occurs if the plaintiff actually takes the next step and initiates a public 
lawsuit. 
This case therefore stands in stark contrast to the disclosure that was at issue in Doe. 
In Doe, the defendant doctors had tried using the plaintiffs prelitigation materials against 
her. 1999 UT 74 at <pi. Here, however, Munson is charged with having used her own 
documents to support her own case. Whatever confidentiality protections do or do not attach 
to such documents, Munson should be granted the right to use her own documents and 
medical records in any manner that she sees fit. Neither § 78-14-12 nor Doe says anything 
to the contrary. 
Dr. Chamberlain responds by asserting that by submitting her medical records or 
expert reports to the prelitigation panel, Munson has given control over that privilege to the 
Utah State Legislature. Chamberlain's Br. at pp. 28. Not only is this assertion of Legislative 
control not supported by authority, but it is also a non-issue in the context of this particular 
case. The privilege asserted by the Legislature in § 78-14-12 is over the prelitigation panel's 
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proceedings, not the documents submitted to the panel. Here, no party has requested 
permission to in any way discuss or refer to the panel or to its proceedings. All that is at 
issue is certain documents (prepared by a party, not the panel) which happen to have been 
submitted to the panel. While Munson certainly cannot waive the protections afforded by 
the Legislature to the panel's proceedings, there is no reason that she cannot waive any 
protections that have attached to her own documents by her own choice to submit them to the 
panel in support of her own case. 
Regardless, as noted above, this entire analytical discussion is, like Dr. Chamberlain's 
other distinction-based arguments, ultimately diversionary. The basis for Munson's appeal 
is that regardless of whether the documents are or not deemed to be under the § 78-14-12 
confidentiality umbrella, her expert witnesses are deemed qualified to view all such 
documents. There is nothing in Doe or § 78-14-12 that compels a contrary result, and the 
purported distinction between prelitigation and evidentiary documents does not change this 
result either. Rather than drawing the unnecessary and ultimately inapplicable distinction 
between prelitigation and evidentiary documents, Munson instead respectfully suggests that 
this Court follow Doe as written and not try to distinguish it into something new. Doe 
expressly stated that prelitigation materials are confidential, and then stated that sanctions 
could be imposed in a case where a party had attached such materials to a publicly filed brief. 
The trial court in this case took this ruling a step further and held that private disclosure to 
a party's own retained expert is also sanctionable. The trial court's ruling on that discrete 
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question can and should be overturned without violating, distinguishing, or challenging Doe 
in any way. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DR. CHAMBERLAIN'S ATTEMPT TO 
OBTAIN A MORE FAVORABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW BY CREATING 
CONFUSION REGARDING THE RULINGS AND ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL. 
Finally, Dr. Chamberlain spends much of his brief describing how confused he 
apparently is regarding the nature of this appeal. Dr. Chamberlain specifically claims that 
he is confused regarding (1) which ruling is being appealed from, and (2) what issues were 
actually raised in Munson's Opening Brief. Both sources of confusion share a significant 
common characteristic: namely, if accepted by this Court, both would result in this case being 
reviewed under the more deferential abuse of discretion standard of review. Rather than 
accepting Dr. Chamberlain's invitation to afford him such an unearned benefit, however, this 
Court should instead conclude that neither of the confusion based arguments has merit. 
A. There is no valid basis for Dr. Chamberlain to claim confusion over which 
ruling is at issue. 
Dr. Chamberlain first claims that he is confused over which ruling is being appealed. 
See Dr. Chamberlain Br. at pp. 1-2. This claim of confusion should be ignored, however, 
because Munson's Opening Brief was in fact quite clear regarding which rulings are at issue. 
On page 1 of Munson's Opening Brief, she succinctly stated that "there are two rulings at 
issue in this appeal," and then identified those rulings as being (1) the mistrial ruling, and (2) 
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the summary judgment ruling. IdL4 At the beginning of her Argument section, Munson 
repeated this assertion, again stating that the summary judgment ruling and the mistrial 
rulings are the two rulings at issue. L± at 8 n.4. Munson reiterated this in her Conclusion 
section, wherein she requested that this Court "overturn the order of mistrial and the grant 
of summary judgment." Munson's Opening Br. at p. 35. Indeed, while the terms "summary 
judgment" and "mistrial" were used throughout the brief, the terms "reconsider" and 
"reconsideration" do not appear anywhere in the Statement of the Issues, the Summary of the 
Argument, the Argument, or the Conclusion sections of Munson's Opening Brief. Thus, 
other than passing references to the reconsideration motion in the Statement of the Case, 
there is literally nothing in Munson's Opening Brief that indicates that that motion is in any 
way being placed at issue. 
Dr. Chamberlain actually admits in his own brief that he fully understands that 
Munson's argument is focused on the summary judgment and mistrial rulings. On page 2 of 
his brief, Dr. Chamberlain acknowledges that the mistrial ruling was "the focus of the 
opening brief." Similarly, on page 8, Dr. Chamberlain notes that the mistrial and summary 
judgment rulings are the "rulings at issue." On page 9 he notes that Munson had "argue[d] 
that Judge Davis incorrectly ruled she had breached the confidentiality of the prelitigation 
proceedings," and on page 14 he states that it "is clear in the opening brief [ ] that Ms. 
4As was explained on page 8 n. 4 of Munson's Opening Brief, these two rulings were 
expressly predicated on the same erroneous conclusion of law, and have therefore been 
addressed together throughout this appeal. 
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Munson's primary contention now is that Judge Davis erred by ordering a mistrial." In light 
of this, his confusion-based attempt to gain a more favorable standard of review should be 
rejected.5 
B. This Court should hold that the Notice of Appeal that was filed in this case 
provided sufficient notice that the summary judgment and mistrial rulings 
would be appealed. 
Dr. Chamberlain next argues that the Notice of Appeal that was filed in this case 
should be construed so as to limit this appeal to an analysis of the Motion for 
Reconsideration. This argument should be rejected by this Court for two different reasons. 
First, Utah law allows an appellate court to overlook an error in the Notice of Appeal 
as long as that error is not one of timeliness. "Despite the apparent rigidity of rule 3(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 'notices of appeal are to be liberally construed,'" and 
a notice of appeal may therefore be deemed "adequate even if it does not strictly adhere to 
the requirements of rule 3(d)." State v. Valdovinos. 2003 UT App 432, ffl[17, 18, 82 P.3d 
1167. As long as the Notice of Appeal "sufficiently notifies" a party of the issues that are 
going to be appealed, clerical mistakes within the Notice of Appeal (such as misidentification 
of the parties or the rulings) simply do not limit a court's ability to consider the rulings that 
were placed at issue in the actual brief. InreB.B., 2004 UT 39, f 10, 94 P.3d 252. 
5Dr. Chamberlain's additional reference to the Docketing Statement as being support 
for his confusion should be rejected, because the Utah Supreme Court has held that the issue 
designations in a docketing statement have no bearing on a party's right to subsequently raise 
different issues in the appellate brief itself. See Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 
(Utah 1996). 
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This principle was made plain by the recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Davis v. Central Utah Counseling Center, 2006 UT 52, -P.3d-. In Davis, the Court held that 
"the timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional requirement for appellate 
review," and that "[e]ven where an appellant files a notice 'crippled with defects' and fails 
to effectively serve the opposing party, the notice is jurisdictionally sufficient if it complies 
with the timeliness requirement." Id. at <|fl4. This Court's decision in State v. Valdovinos 
is likewise applicable. In Valdovinos, this Court considered a case like this one where the 
notice of appeal referred to a different ruling than the ruling which was later addressed in the 
brief. Rather than allowing this mistake to limit the scope of the appeal, however, this Court 
instead considered the appeal as it was briefed, due in large part to the appellee's failure to 
show that it was prejudiced by the misidentification in the notice of appeal. 2003 UT App 
432 at Tf20. Here, not only does Dr. Chamberlain openly acknowledge that Munson's 
arguments on appeal are directed at the summary judgment and mistrial rulings, but he then 
fully briefs his position with respect to those two rulings. As such, the misidentification in 
this Notice of Appeal was non-prejudicial and should not serve as the basis for limiting the 
scope of this appeal. 
Second, consistent with the "sufficient notice" standard referenced above, it is well-
accepted that where multiple rulings are intertwined, a notice of appeal that references one 
of those rulings provides a proper basis for reviewing the others. In Valdovinos, this Court 
considered a Defendant's appeal from a sentencing decision. Though the sentencing had 
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been based on guilty pleas in three separate criminal cases, the notice of appeal only 
referenced one of those three cases. Id. at 1HP-7, 8 n.l. In spite of this error, this Court 
allowed the appeal of all three rulings to proceed, explaining that the three rulings were 
sufficiently intertwined so as to warrant consideration of all the rulings. Specifically, this 
Court held that sufficient notice had been provided because the three rulings had all been 
argued in "one consolidated hearing" and had been ruled on "on the same date." Id at J^20. 
A similar result was reached under similar circumstances in In re B.B., wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court allowed a ruling to be considered on appeal even though a different ruling 
had been identified in the notice of appeal. As in Valdovinos, the court in InreB.B. noted 
that the two rulings had been argued and decided on the same date, and the court therefore 
considered the non-identified ruling on appeal. 2002 UT App 82 at Tfl 1. 
As in Valdovinos and In re B.B., the summary judgment motion and the motion for 
reconsideration were briefed concurrently, argued in the same hearing, and ruled on in the 
same written order that was issued on the same date. These two particular motions are 
additionally intertwined insofar as Munson expressly incorporated the reconsideration 
motion into her response to the summary judgment motion. R. at 398-397. Judge Pullan 
acknowledged this link in his ruling, holding that Dr. Jacobs was disqualified "based upon 
[the] denial of the Motion to Reconsider," and that summary judgment was therefore proper 
only because of this disqualification. R. at 544. As such, Dr. Chamberlain clearly had 
^sufficient notice" that both the summary judgment ruling and the mistrial ruling were at 
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issue when the Notice of Appeal listed the reconsideration motion as being the basis for the 
appeal. 
In Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that "[w]hen appealing from an entire final judgment, . . . it is not necessary to 
specify each interlocutory order of which the appellant seeks review.5' Id. at 50. Thus, 
because the summary judgment ruling is properly at issue here, all prior rulings-including 
the mistrial ruling-are properly at issue as well. Dr. Chamberlain's argument that the appeal 
should be limited to the reconsideration motion should be rejected. 
C. There is no valid basis for Dr. Chamberlain to claim confusion over which 
issues are being argued on appeal. 
Finally, Dr. Chamberlain claims that he is confused as to what issues are being argued 
on appeal. Specifically, Dr. Chamberlain maintains that he is confused as to whether Munson 
is really meaning to appeal the trial court's "choice of sanction," or just the confidentiality 
ruling itself. As with the alleged confusion regarding which ruling is on appeal, Dr. 
Chamberlain argues that this confusion should serve as the basis for granting him a more 
favorable standard of review. 
As a threshold matter, the notion that Munson's response to the cross-examination 
argument is somehow directed at the trial court's "choice of sanction" is simply incorrect. 
Munson has not argued at any point in this process that a trial court must choose "sanction 
A" over "sanction B" in a particular circumstance. By definition, the term "sanction" refers 
to "a penalty or coercive measure that results from failure to comply with a law, rule, or 
Page 20 of 24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
order." Black's Law Dictionary, Sanction (8th ed. 2004). For example, the trial court below 
"sanctioned" Munson by disqualifying her expert. By contrast, the cross-examination tools 
discussed on pages 20-26 of the Opening Brief and again above (such as sealing the 
courtroom or conducting an in camera review of the testimony) would not have punished any 
party at all, but would instead have simply facilitated the cross-examination that Dr. 
Chamberlain allegedly wants. As such, describing this response as advancing a "choice of 
sanction" argument makes little sense insofar as there is nothing sanctionable about any of 
these options. 
Regardless, there are two basic problems with Dr. Chamberlain's argument that this 
response should provide him with a more favorable standard of review. First, Munson was 
quite clear in her brief regarding what was and was not at issue. Specifically, Munson 
repeatedly and unequivocally stated that the issue on appeal was whether the trial court was 
correct in concluding that the confidentiality requirement of Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-
12(l)(d) was violated in this case. See, e.g., Munson's Opening Br. at p.l ("That mistrial 
ruling was in turn based on the trial court's erroneous interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-14-12(l)(d)"); p.8 ("The trial court erred when it concluded that the confidentiality 
requirement set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(l)(d) (2005) was violated in this 
case"); p.8 n.4; p. 12 ("The trial court's threshold conclusion that there was a breach of 
confidentiality in this case was incorrect."); p.26 ("The resolution of this appeal hinges upon 
the question of what the Legislature intended when it designated the prelitigation process as 
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'confidential.'5'). As the appellant, it is Munson's prerogative to determine what issues she 
wishes to raise and argue, not Dr. Chamberlain's. Regardless of what this Court does or does 
not do with the choice of sanction issue raised by Dr. Chamberlain, Munson as the appellant 
is entitled to first receive a ruling on the question that she actually raised, and that ruling 
should be governed by its own appropriate legal standard. 
Second, to the extent that resolution of this appeal requires review of the trial court's 
discretionary rulings, Utah law plainly holds that it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court 
to base a discretionary ruling on a misinterpretation of law. See Munson's Opening Br. at 
p.2 (citing cases for this proposition). Regardless of whether this Court focuses on the issues 
raised in the Motion for a Mistrial, the Motion for Summary Judgment, or even the Motion 
for Reconsideration, all of these rulings still turn on the correctness of the trial court's 
threshold § 78-14-12 conclusion. If the trial court had properly interpreted that statute, the 
trial would have proceeded as scheduled on February 25, 2004, and there would have been 
no mistrial ruling, no reconsideration request, and no grant of summary judgment. Thus, it 
is this single misinterpretation of law (which even Dr. Chamberlain admits should be 
reviewed de novo, Dr. Chamberlain Br. at p.2) that set this whole chain of legal events in 
motion, and all of the subsequent actions by the trial court, whether discretionary or not, were 
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based upon that single ruling's validity. Munson has properly challenged that determination, 
and it ought to be reviewed for correctness.6 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's conclusion that a expert who is retained after a prelitigation panel has 
concluded its work must then be shielded from all documents that were submitted to that 
panel is flawed. This assertion is not mandated by either § 78-14-12 or Doe v. Maret and 
it should now be overturned by this Court. Instead, this Court should conclude that retained 
experts are allowed to view all information relating to a case, whether that information was 
submitted to the prelitgation panel or not. 
DATED this 2la- day of October, 2006. 
i 
R W N D. TENNEY, and 
KENNETH PARKINSON, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
6In light of this, Dr. Chamberlain's repeated allegation that Munson has somehow 
admitted that she has no expert is disingenuous. See, e.g.. Dr. Chamberlain's Br. at pp. 7-8, 
15-16. As set forth throughout the arguments, motions, and briefing in this case, Munson has 
maintained all along that Dr. Jacobs was a properly qualified expert and that he had a proper 
basis for charging Dr. Chamberlain with having violated the standard of care. Dr. Jacobs was 
only prevented from testifying at trial because of Dr. Chamberlain's assertion that Dr. Jacobs 
had improperly viewed prelitigation materials-an assertion that has been directly challenged 
at all stages of this proceeding. As such, there has never been a "concession" that Munson 
had no expert or that summary judgment was appropriate. 
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1 WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were taken 
2 pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3 * * * * * 
4 ALEXANDER JACOBS, M.D., 
5 having been first duly sworn to state the whole truth, 
6 testified as follows: 
7 EXAMINATION 
8 BY MS. SHERMAN: 
9 Q. This deposition is being taken pursuant to the Utah 
10 Rules of Civil Procedure. Could you please state your full 
11 name and spell it for the record. 
12 A. Alexander Jacobs, J-a-c-o-b-s, A-1-e-x-a-n-d-e-r. 
13 Q. My name is Tawni Sherman. I represent Dr. Bruce 
14 Chamberlain and the Central Utah Medical Center. This 
15 deposition is a chance for me to ask you a few questions 
16 about your opinion on this case. Til be asking you about 
17 your background and your expert opinion on some of the 
18 medical issues raised in this case. Have you been deposed 
19 before? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. How many times, ballpark if that's — 
22 A. Ten times. 
23 Q. Were those all in medical malpractice cases? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. What other types of cases have you participated in? 
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1 A. Workman's compensation, personal injury. This may 
2 be the second time in my life I think I'm being deposed in a 
3 medical malpractice case. 
4 Q. So you are familiar with the sort of ground rules 
5 for a deposition? 
6 A. I think so. I am sure if I err, you will reguide me 
7 just like the guidance systems on the car. 
8 Q. I will certainly try to. But if I do ask a question 
9 that you don't understand for whatever reason, just let me 
10 know and I'll be happy to rephrase it. 
11 A. That's acceptable. 
12 Q. Also, any time you need to take a break, we are 
13 happy to stop. Just let us know. 
14 A. Thank you. 
15 Q. Are you taking any medications today? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. We ask because sometimes they can affect a 
18 deponent's ability to understand and answer questions. 
19 A. I thought perhaps you were suggesting I needed some. 
20 Q. Having known you for only two minutes, I wouldn't do 
21 that. Could you please tell me your address. 
22 A. 3300 East 17th Avenue. Denver, Colorado. The zip 
23 code is 80206. 
24 Q. I have seen your CV, but I'll just go briefly over 
25 some of the significant events in your history. Where did 
1 (Pages 1 to 4) 
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1 you graduate from college, undergrad? 
2 A. Yeshiva University, New York. 
3 Q. What was your major? 
4 A. It was kind of a mixed major. Arts and sciences. 
5 The science major was biology and the arts was English lit or 
6 something. 
7 Q. Where did you go to med school? 
8 A. University of Colorado Medical Center. 
9 Q. When did you graduate? 
10 A. In 1972. 
11 Q. Did you have any awards or honors? 
12 A. I did. 
13 Q. What were those? 
14 A. Gosh, I really don't even remember. A few awards 
15 that are titled by the name of the donor and the person who 
16 sponsored the awards, but -- you know, I think everybody in 
17 medical school gets some sort of an honor award when they 
18 graduate. I graduated with honors, if that makes a 
19 difference. There were some awards for showing aptitude and 
20 some for showing up every morning and some for not being sick 
21 too often, that kind of stuff. 
22 Q. Where did you do your internship? 
23 A. At the University of Colorado Medical Center 
24 Affiliated Hospitals. 
25 Q. Any specialty? 
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1 A. Internal medicine. 
2 Q. How about your residency? 
3 A. Same place, same specialty. 
4 Q. For how many years did you do the residency? 
5 A. Well, the combined internship and residency was 
6 three years. 
7 Q. You are board certified in internal medicine? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. In any other fields or areas of practice? 
10 A. I am also certified as a medical director by the 
11 American Medical Directors Association, and I'm also 
12 certified as a level 2 rater for the Department of Labor, 
13 Colorado Division of Workman's Compensation. 
14 Q. The medical director certification, is that for your 
15 work with nursing homes, medical centers, that sort of thing? 
16 A. And hospice and home health and hospitals as well. 
17 Q. You are licensed to practice medicine in Colorado, I 
18 take it? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. In any other states? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Have you ever had any disciplinary actions taken 
23 against you? 
24 A. Only by my wife. 
25 Q. Any suspensions of your license? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Have you ever had any malpractice claims against 
3 you? 
4 A. No. Thank God. 
5 Q. You are a lucky man. 
6 A. I am, and I thank God every day for it. 
7 Q. Are you current on your continuing medical 
8 educations? 
9 A. Yes, I am. 
10 Q. Do you have any CMEs or other training that applies 
11 specifically to the opinions you will be rendering in this 
12 case? 
13 A. Well, as they relate to internal medicine, I get at 
14 least 50 hours of continuing medical education per year. 
15 Because I also teach at the university and have students, 
16 there are additional hours of continuing medical education, 
17 but that's more of the teaching format. It's all related to 
18 internal medicine. I guess I'm not sure how it would relate 
19 to the testimony I give you, but . . . 
20 Q. But in a general way — 
21 A. In a general way it's related to the treatment, 
22 diagnosis, and taking care of patients. 
23 Q. Please walk me briefly through your employment from 
24 the time you graduated from med school until the present. 
25 A. Well, from the time I graduated medical school, then 
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1 I did my internship and residency at the University of 
2 Affiliated Hospitals. Then in 1975,1 graduated, finished. 
3 I become board eligible, shortly thereafter board certified. 
4 Then I started practicing in the location I mentioned before, 
5 so I've actually been there for about 27 years. 
6 Q. Have you ever published any articles or books? 
7 A. I have. 
8 Q. On what subjects? 
9 A. Leukemia, sexually transmitted diseases. Those are 
10 the only two that got kind of formally published and accepted 
11 in what they call reviewed literature. I've had a number of 
12 small things like in the Rocky Mountain Medical Journal and 
13 things that I published in the university's letter that goes 
14 out to students. 
15 Q. You mentioned that you teach? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. What subjects do you teach? 
18 A. Internal medicine, clinical diagnosis, treatment, 
19 and primary care, primary patient follow-up. 
20 Q. How long have you done that? 
21 A. Since I graduated from my residency. 
22 Q. Have you ever served as an expert witness? 
23 A. I think so. The definition of an expert ~ 1 think 
24 your definition may differ from mine, but I think I 
25 understand what you mean. 
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1 Q. What is your — 
2 A. Not just as - well, I don't know if I'm much of an 
3 expert, but when 1 testify regarding a case that isn't just 
4 my firsthand knowledge of taking care of a patient, it's 
5 considered expert testimony. 
6 Q. Right. 
7 A. So, yes, I have. 
8 Q. On how many occasions? 
9 A. In my entire career, you mean? 
10 Q. Yes. 
11 A. That includes depositions and hearings? 
12 Q. Yes. 
13 A. Maybe 20 times. 
14 Q. Do you generally testify for the plaintiff or the 
15 defense? Can you characterize it that way or is it a mixed 
16 bag? 
17 A. It's a mixed bag. 
18 Q. Do you consider yourself a part-time expert, an 
19 occasional expert in terms of your service related to the 
20 legal issues? 
21 A. Well, if I'm classified as an expert, I guess I'm 
22 always an expert. You mean, in terms of when I testify? 
23 Q. In terms of the composition of your practice, I 
24 guess. Some physicians spend almost full time working in 
25 medicolegal consulting, some do it once a year, once every 
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1 couple of years. 
2 A. The portion of my practice that's comprised of 
3 medicolegal work is maybe 15 percent. It may be lower if I 
4 exclude like workman's compensation rating, which I do for 
5 the state. 
6 Q. You mentioned that this is the second medical 
7 malpractice case that you have been involved with? 
8 A. That I can think of, yeah. 
9 Q. Who were the lawyers involved in the other medical 
10 malpractice case you were involved with? Are they Colorado 
11 attorneys? 
12 A. Yes. Cates & Company or Cates, et al. Cates & 
13 Milzer, maybe is the name. One of them is also a physician 
14 and an attorney. That was the other most recent case that I 
15 testified in. 
16 Q. In that case, did you testify at a deposition or in 
17 court or both? 
18 A. That was - actually, 1 just thought of another 
19 case. So one of them was just a deposition and the case was 
20 settled during the deposition, so that never even finished. 
21 The other one is actually in court. The only reason 1 
22 remembered it is because it was the same attorney. 
23 MR. PARKINSON: If you would like to settle the case 
24 during this deposition, feel free. 
25 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) So you testified in court on the 
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1 second case? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Were both of those cases in Colorado? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Briefly, what were the subjects involved in those 
6 other two medical malpractice cases? 
7 A. One of them was a patient who had a leg amputated 
8 after developing a clot in her artery. The other case was a 
9 patient who received two drugs that interact with one anotheii 
10 and she developed a fatal heart irregularity that caused her 
11 to die. 
12 Q. Whafs your normal rate for expert testimony? 
13 A. $500 an hour. 
14 Q. Does that rate differ for consulting with the 
15 attorney rather than testifying? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. What's that rate? 
18 A. I think $250 an hour. 
19 Q. Who first contacted you to serve as an expert in 
20 this case? 
21 A. Dr. Kane, K-a-n-e. 
22 Q. Do you recall Dr. Kane's first name? 
23 A. I can find out by calling my office. I've only 
24 talked to him twice and so I don't remember his first name. 
25 But this is the first I heard of the case when he called me a 
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1 number of months ago. 
2 Q. Did you know him previously? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Who is Dr. Kane? 
5 A. I think he has some company that tries to find 
6 people who are versatile in a given field so that when 
7 somebody is looking for a physician to review a case, he kind 
8 of hooks the two up together for a fee. 
9 Q. Before you were contacted to serve as an expert in 
10 this case, did you know the plaintiff, Rebekah Munson? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Did you know Mr. Parkinson or anyone in his law 
13 firm? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. When did Dr. Kane first contact you? 
16 A . I don't remember the exact date. 
17 Q. Month and a year would be fine. 
18 A. Yes. A number of months ago. 
19 Q. Was it in calendar year 2002? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Spring; do you remember? 
22 A. I think in June or maybe May. 
23 Q. You said Dr. Kane called you? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. How long did that first discussion with Dr. Kane 
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1 last? 
2 A. Five minutes. 
3 Q. What did he tell you or ask you in that 
4 conversation? 
5 A. He asked me if I see patients with polymyositis and 
6 if I treat polymyositis and would I be willing to review a 
7 case from out of town, and I think that was the gist of it. 
8 He may have even told me a little bit about the case, but it 
9 was just in very vague terms. 
10 Q. Have you seen patients with polymyositis? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Do you have an engagement letter or other written 
13 agreement either with Dr. Kane or with Mr. Parkinson? 
14 A. None with Dr. Kane. And 1 certainly don't have a 
15 letter, but we have an agreement that he has paid me for 
16 reviewing the records. He took me out to lunch today. We 
17 had an agreement that we would drive up here together. We 
18 don't have any kind of a formal contract. I don't work for 
19 Mr. Parkinson or his company. 
20 Q. How much have you been paid so far to review records 
21 in this case? 
22 A. I don't know for sure. Several hundred dollars, 
23 maybe six or eight. I am really not sure. My office manager 
24 could tell you. 
25 Q. When was your first contact with Mr. Parkinson? 
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1 A. In person or by mail or » 
2 Q. Any contact after Dr. Kane connected the two of you. 
3 A. I think a couple of weeks after Dr. Kane got in 
4 touch with me, I got a letter telling me, Thank you for 
5 agreeing to review the case; and then shortly after that it 
6 was followed by some records for me to review. I think there 
7 may have been something in the letter about the fee 
8 structure, which Dr. Kane also reiterated, I think. Not just 
9 reiterated, but actually suggested, because I really wasn't 
10 sure what was in the ballpark and what wasn't. And until 
11 today, I don't think we have spoken or met. We may have had 
12 additional communications. For example, there was a second 
13 mailing, but, then again, I think it was handled mostly by 
14 paralegals and so on and so forth, but always over the 
15 signature of Mr. Parkinson. 
16 Q. What was in that second mailing from Mr. Parkinson? 
17 A. The second mailing was actually from a Heather 
18 Finch, which, I guess, is one of the paralegals there. I'm 
19 not sure. They had forwarded some additional records that 
20 covered office visits from June 18, 2002 dating backwards in 
21 time to September of 1999. And because these records weren't 
22 included in the original mailing, the question was. Did this 
23 in any way alter or change my opinion or what I thought of 
24 the additional records? 
25 Q. Did those records affect your opinion of the case? 
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1 A. 1 think my conclusion in the letter to them after 
2 reviewing those additional records was that -- and I quote, 
3 "In general these notes do not add much to the main question 
4 of corticosteroid usage for prolonged periods and its 
5 intended complications in a patient with at best questionable 
6 indications." So there wasn't really any ~ 1 didn't change 
7 my mind or anything. It basically reiterated what I had 
8 already concluded. You know, that letter was in June, so my 
9 date as to when I started with all this must have been a 
10 little bit before then, maybe even May or April. 
11 Q. Thank you. How many hours have you spent on this 
12 case so far? 
13 A. Well, I've spent about three or four hours reviewing 
14 the data and then another two or three hours — actually, a 
15 little over three hours yesterday re-reviewing the data, and 
16 I don't know, maybe another hour or two. It's hard to guess. 
17 Maybe 10 or 12 hours total. Some things just take longer. 
18 Trying to decipher handwritten notes is very time-consuming, 
19 but reading several pages of typewritten notes is very quick. 
20 I don't remember exactly, but that's something I can get for 
21 you because my office will bill for the time I spent. 
22 Q. So you did keep records of your time? 
23 A. Records of how much time was kept and how much was 
24 billed and at what rate. 
25 Q. Your office manager has those? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Have you spent any time consulting with anyone 
3 besides people from Mr. Parkinson's office? Any other 
4 physicians? Any nurses? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Shared any opinions with your colleagues? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. How much additional time do you contemplate spending 
9 on this case? 
10 A. None, I hope. After I'm done, the two sides will 
11 come out, shake hands and say, Good-bye, everything is fine. 
12 Q. What documents have you reviewed in preparation for 
13 your testimony today? 
14 A. You mean besides the records that were sent to me? 
15 Q. So you have reviewed the medical records? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Anything else? 
18 A. I don't think so. 
19 Q. In formulating or preparing your opinion, did you 
20 review any treatises or medical texts or articles, things of 
21 that nature? 
22 A. Not so much in preparation for the deposition, but 
23 when first getting the case. 1 think I went over the 
24 Rheumatology Primer. It's kind of an annual printout of 
25 what's new in rheumatology and what's new in collagen 
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1 vascular diseases. I remember going over it briefly, and I 
2 remember last night saying, Gee, I wonder where the copies 
3 are I made of that? I couldn't locate them. I did look over 
4 to kind of refresh my memory, and to look to see if there is 
5 something new and exciting. 
6 Q. Is the Rheumatology Primer a newsletter or a 
7 journal? 
8 A. It's a book. It's kind of a paperback large book 
9 that's printed by the American Rheumatologic Association. 
10 Q. Is that revised yearly? 
11 A. I think yearly, perhaps every couple of years. In 
12 some diseases there isn't much change made from year to year, 
13 so it's pretty much like the previous book. And in some 
14 diseases not only are there changes, but they are only 
15 diseases to contemplate, so obviously the changes are quite 
16 profound. 
17 Q. Did you find anything in the Rheumatology Primer 
18 that applied to the facts of this case? j 
19 A. Not anything new. Pretty much the old things that 
20 have been true for a number of years when it comes to 
21 diseases of the joints and muscles and of the immune reactive 
22 nature. 
23 Q. So did you review sections on polymyositis? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Anything else that you remember? 
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1 A. Sections on ankylosing spondylitis. 
2 Q. Have you read any deposition transcripts taken in 
3 this case? 
4 A. Well, not really. I wasn't even aware of any until 
5 today at lunch when I was kind of told that there had been a 
6 deposition, and asked a few questions regarding the 
7 deposition. 
8 Q. Regarding the deposition of Ms. Munson or of 
9 Dr. Chamberlain or both? 
10 A. Of Dr. Chamberlain only. 
11 Q. Have you reviewed any interrogatories or responses 
12 to interrogatories? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Any of the other pleadings or legal papers filed in 
15 this matter? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Have you ever had a discussion with Rebekah Munson? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Today was the first time you talked to 
20 Mr. Parkinson? 
21 A. Yes. Well, to the best of my knowledge. I don't 
22 think we have talked before. As I said, we communicated by 
23 mail. There may have been one discussion before or shortly 
24 after 1 got the notes, but 1 am not sure of that. But he can 
25 answer that question for us if his memory is better about it 
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1 than mine. 
2 MR. PARKINSON: Just for clarification on the 
3 record, we did have a phone call. 
4 MS. SHERMAN: You did have a phone call? 
5 MR. PARKINSON: Yes. 
6 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) Do you have plans to discuss this 
7 case or consult with anyone else? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. To prepare for your deposition, I know you've 
10 touched on this briefly, but you reviewed the medical 
11 records, you had lunch with Mr. Parkinson today. Is there 
12 anything else that you did to prepare? 
13 A. No, nothing specific. 
14 Q. Is that your file in this case? 
15 A. Yes, it is. 
16 Q. What documents or materials do you have in that 
17 file? 
18 A. Well, I have some of the communications. I have a 
19 copy of a letter I sent on June 26 after reviewing the 
20 additional records that were sent to me. 
21 Q. That was a letter to Mr. Parkinson? 
22 A. Yes. But it was actually addressed to Ms. Finch at 
23 the Howard, Lewis & Petersen, P.C. law firm. What was I 
24 telling you, what I have here? 
25 Q. The contents of your file, yes. 
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1 A. Notes of clinical visits from Dr. Call and 
2 Dr. Chamberlain and Dr. Gremillion and Dr. Rosenthal and 
3 Dr. Watkins, and even some communications from Dr. Jones. 
4 Q. Anything else in the file? 
5 A, When I originally reviewed the file, I took some 
6 notes. I reviewed those as well. 
7 Q. At one time, you had some of the articles from the 
8 primer? 
9 A. I had some from the primer, and also from textbook 
10 of internal medicine regarding dealing with these two 
11 diseases. 
12 Q. Do you recall which textbook? 
13 A. I think Harrison's. 
14 Q. Do you consider Harrison1 s to be authoritative in 
15 the field? 
16 A. Yeah. Harrison's is pretty authoritative in all 
17 internal medicine. 
18 Q. How about the Rheumatology Primer, do you consider 
19 that to be authoritative and reliable? 
20 A. It's more specialized because it deals just with 
21 rheumatologic diseases, but yes, it is. 
22 Q. Now, I have received a report you prepared dated 
23 June 5, 2002, or a report that you signed. 
24 A. Perhaps that report is with copies of some of the 
25 literature. 
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1 Q. I'll give you a copy when we get to discussing that 
2 in a little more detail. Did you prepare that report? 
3 A. If you can show it to me, 1 will be able to answer 
4 that question because I am not sure what we are referring to. 
5 MS. SHERMAN: 1 will offer this as Exhibit 1. 
6 (Deposition Exhibit 1 was marked.) 
7 THE DEPONENT: Yes, 1 prepared and signed this. 
8 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) So you recognize that report? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. When did you finish that report? 
11 A. June 17, 2002. 
12 Q. Could it have been May 17? 
13 A. Well, it's dated June 17. 
14 Q. I'm sorry. I was looking at the front page. 
15 A. I guess maybe I dictated it on June 5. 
16 Q. Do you recall dictating this report? 
17 A. Yeah, vaguely. 
18 Q. Did you dictate that to your secretary or to someone 
19 in Mr. Parkinson's office? 
20 A. No, to my secretary. It's based actually on a 
21 report that maybe ~ here it is. I do have it. It's based 
22 upon a report that I prepared shortly after reviewing the 
23 medical records, which is kind of a summary of the medical 
24 records and some sort of a temporal representation of what I 
25 read. It's dated March 4, 2002. Actually, that report helps 
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1 me answer a previous question because at that point I had 
2 spent 4 1/2 hours reviewing the records. 
3 Q. You have a copy of that report there in your file? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. When we take a break, Til ask to take a look at 
6 your file. 
7 A. Okay. 
8 Q. Did you prepare any drafts of your June 5 report? 
9 A. Drafts of which report? 
10 Q. The June 17 report. 
11 A. Well, I think that this was the draft. This March 4 
12 report, which was a summary of my record review and my 
13 opinions kind of acted as a draft, and I see now that this is 
14 kind of just formalizing this report. 
15 Q. Okay. Were there any changes between the March and 
16 the June reports? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Did anyone assist you in preparing your report? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Are you going to be rendering any opinion regarding 
21 Central Utah Medical Center? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Now, I would like to get to your opinion in this 
24 matter. First, I'll ask just some general background 
25 questions about the bases of your opinion and then I'll go 
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1 through the report with you and ask you a few questions about 
2 that in detail. What facts have you relied on to reach your 
3 opinion? And when I say "your opinion," for purposes of the 
4 deposition, we'll refer to the June 17 report. 
5 A. Okay. Well, the data on which that opinion is based 
6 is my medical education, my knowledge of medicine, my 
7 knowledge and experience in treating patients with this 
8 disease, and the records as they were submitted to me. and 
9 review of all the physicians, their care, their notes, their 
10 opinions, and their plans regarding this case. 
11 Q. How many patients with polymyositis have you 
12 treated? 
13 A. Probably half a dozen in my entire career. 
14 Q. Is there a difference between myositis and 
15 polymyositis? 
16 A. Well, myositis is kind of a nondescript term. It 
17 just means muscle and formation. Polymyositis is a name of a 
18 disease, a specific disease. So, yes, there is a difference. 
19 I guess it's like headaches and migraine. 
20 Q. What are the hallmarks of polymyositis? 
21 A. The hallmarks of polymyositis is muscle weakness and 
22 muscle pain, proximal more than distal, inflammation, 
23 tenderness. In addition to pain, there is actually 
24 tenderness to the muscles. There is a feeling of malaise and 
25 fatigue, weakness. Generally there is clinical history of 
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1 gradual progressive pain, difficulty in doing acts of daily 
2 living such as getting up out of a chair or reaching high 
3 items up on shelves, which again is testament to the proximal 
4 distribution. But in severe cases, it reaches distally as 
5 well. The features include not only those clinical aspects, 
6 but they include elevation of the sedimentation rate, 
7 C-reactive protein, elevation of creatinine phosphokinase, 
8 which is a muscle enzyme, along with aldolase, which is 
9 perhaps more specific. 
10 Q. Elevated aldolase, then? 
11 A. Yes. Other hallmarks include a specific 
12 neuropathology that can be documented by electromyographic 
13 testing, but the hallmark and possibly the gold standard is a 
14 muscle biopsy that actually shows the perivascular and 
15 perimyositis inflammation, the leukocytosis, the white blood 
16 cell predomination and lymphocyte gathering around muscle 
17 cells and various states of muscle destruction and muscle 
18 rebuilding, muscle scarring and the inflammatory response. 
19 Q. In the roughly six patients you have treated with 
20 polymyositis, what has been your clinical course of those 
21 patients, if you can generalize across the six? 
22 A. Well, polymyositis can be divided into a number of 
23 different diseases. The cases I'm talking about are patients 
24 with fairly pure polymyositis, because polymyositis-like 
25 diseases can be identified as a perineal plasty syndrome. In 
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1 other words, an association with some kind of cancer. It can 
2 be associated with other collagen vascular diseases like 
3 lupus or Sjogren or scleroderma. It's also not an uncommon 
4 feature to have polymyositis and dermatomyositis together 
5 where there is a tremendous amount of skin involvement in 
6 addition to the connective tissue of the muscles. So of the 
7 pure polymyositis patients I have had, their clinical course 
8 has been variable. Those that have mild symptoms and were 
9 relatively younger did well and responded to 
10 anti-inflammatory drugs. 
11 Q. Such as? Like, just NS? 
12 A. Nonsteroidals as well as steroids. Those who were 
13 older — eventually, unfortunately, these patients convert to 
14 patients who have an occult malignancy because it can precede 
15 the obvious cancer by months or years. So actually you have 
16 to look for an occult tumor even though you are treating a 
17 patient whom you've diagnosed with polymyositis. Their 
18 prognosis, obviously, is much worse. 
19 Q. By "occult," is that hidden? 
20 A. Right. So the answer to your question is, it's 
21 really variable. It's really variable as to how well they 
22 do. Those who have the pure diagnosis without other 
23 associated factors and those who are relatively young, they 
24 respond very quickly and very well to steroids. 
25 Q. How many of your patients were this younger, 
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1 mild-symptom profiles? 
2 A. The two or three I can think of right offhand did 
3 very well with short courses, converted pretty quickly to 
4 alternate day therapy. Unfortunately, both moved away. One 
5 to the West Coast and one somewhere in Florida. The last I 
6 heard, they were still doing very well, and this is maybe ten 
7 years after the diagnosis. 
8 Q. Which steroid did you use to treat those two or 
9 three other patients? 
10 A. One prednisone and one prednisolone. 
11 Q. When you described a "short course" of steroidal 
12 therapy, what is a short course? 
13 A. Well, a short course is one to four weeks. But what 
14 I was saying is not that they were on a short course, but 
15 they responded to a short course, so the response was pretty 
16 quick and dramatic. 
17 Q. So they responded well within roughly one to four 
18 weeks. For how long did they continue to be on the steroid 
19 therapy? 
20 A. Years, but at lower doses and switched to alternate 
21 days or courses. One for three years and one for four years 
22 until she moved away. 
23 Q. Were they both women? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Have you been in touch with either - I know you 
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1 mentioned you thought they were doing well. 
2 A. One of them is a friend of a patient who is still 
3 one of my patients, so she frequently sends regards when she 
4 sees me. She is still doing well. She is the one that lives 
5 in California. 
6 Q. Do you know if she is still on steroid treatment? 
7 A. She is not. 
8 Q. Do you know if the other one is still on steroid 
9 treatment? 
10 A . I don't know anything about the other one. 
11 Q. When you say these were lower doses of steroid 
12 treatment over the long term, what kind of doses was it that 
13 you had them on? 
14 A. Once you've gotten a good response, you find the 
15 lowest possible dose to keep them asymptomatic, and then 
16 sometimes you switch to alternate-day steroids, and that 
17 helps reduce the side effects. So if you have a patient, 
18 let's say, who is doing well on 20 a day, you might go to 
19 40 every other day. It's the same dose and you get pretty 
20 much the same effect that's therapeutic, but you get 
21 significantly lower side effects. 
22 Q. Do you recall what doses you had those patients on? 
23 Were they on a 20 milligram maintenance dose or 40 every 
24 other day, or was it some other — 
25 A. Something in that range. The most important thing 
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1 is to use clinical parameters. 
2 Q. Such as? 
3 A. Well, you basically constantly weigh the therapeutic 
4 benefits versus the potential and the actual side effects. 
5 So if the patient is doing very, very well and they have no 
6 muscle aches, no pain, no redness, no irritation, they can do 
7 all of their acts of daily living, you go ahead and cut the 
8 dose. If they continue to do well, you wait the respectable 
9 period of time — and I'm talking about weeks as opposed to 
10 days or months — and you cut it again. Then if the patient 
11 starts saying, I'm having muscle aches; my shoulders are 
12 hurting now, they feel warm to the touch, they are stiff, 
13 they are weak, I can't lift the baby anymore, you go back to 
14 your previous therapeutic dose. 
15 Sometimes you actually have to go a little bit 
16 higher in order to achieve the effect and then come back to 
17 the previous dose. So you keep them there a few extra months 
18 and then try to taper again. But even if you can't taper, 
19 you really achieve a lot of improvement by going to double 
20 the dose but alternate day. 
21 Q. Is that what I've heard described sometimes as 
22 "empiric therapy"? 
23 A. No. Empiric therapy means treatment without a 
24 diagnosis. That's what empiric means. In other words, if I 
25 get a patient who gets admitted to the hospital with sepsis, | 
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1 I know they are infected and they have a life-threatening 
2 infection, I'll treat them with antibiotics empirically 
3 without knowing what bug they have or even which antibiotics 
4 are liable to work. But you try and shotgun-treat every 
5 possible likely infection until you get back culture results 
6 and then you trim the therapy so that you are giving them 
7 just what they need, not a lot of accessory stuff. That's 
8 where the side effects are. 
9 So empiric treatment is something that we usually 
10 reserve for life-threatening cases. It's not the standard 
11 for medicine to treat everybody empirically. That's like 
12 giving you nitroglycerin because you come in with a little 
13 chest pain and it turns out to be a musculoskeletal strain. 
14 Q. So you are saying you follow the clinical signs. Is 
15 that as reported by the patient? Do you do any lab work? 
16 A. Well, "clinical" means not only as reported by the 
17 patient, but also based upon your examination. So the 
18 clinical is the history and the exam. And then laboratory 
19 data generally is used here to kind of- how shall I say 
20 this - kind of fortify your opinion. The problem with lab 
21 work is that once a patient is on treatment, the lab work 
22 becomes much less reliable. 
23 Q. Because of the effects of whatever the treatment is? 
24 A. Some of the medications will affect the lab work 
25 more than they affect the patient. With steroids especially, 
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1 you can actually get a reverse effect. Steroids can 
2 sometimes aggravate a myopathy, particularly if they don't 
3 have polymyositis. You have to be careful. 
4 Q. Is it your opinion that that happened in 
5 Ms. Munson's case; the steroids aggravated a myopathy? 
6 A. I think it's possible. It occurred to me. That's 
7 why we kind of just naturally look for a good initial 
8 response with a therapeutic dose before we say, Okay. And 
9 you look for a very confirmed diagnosis because otherwise 
10 steroids will make you much worse instead of much better. 
11 Then if you attribute it to the disease instead of your 
12 medication, you are kind of led down the primrose path that 
13 ultimately will wind up with a dead patient. I don't know if 
14 I made that clear. 
15 Q. Yes, you did. 
16 MS. SHERMAN: Could you read back his answer, 
17 though, because three or four questions sprang to mind at the 
18 same time. 
19 (The last answer was read back as follows: "I think 
20 it's possible. It occurred to me. That's why we kind of 
21 just naturally look for a good initial response with a 
22 therapeutic dose before we say, Okay. And you look for a 
23 very confirmed diagnosis because otherwise steroids will make] 
24 you much worse instead of much better. Then if you attribute 
25 it to the disease instead of your medication, you are kind of 
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1 led down the primrose path that ultimately will wind up with 
2 a dead patient. I don't know if I made that clear.") 
3 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) If you will take a look at , 
4 Exhibit 1. You indicate in the paragraph marked 1 that 
5 prednisone was given as early as 1998. 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Who is it that prescribed the prednisone in 1998? 
8 A. Well, I don't remember right offhand. | 
9 Q. I was wondering, because as far as I know, 
10 Dr. Chamberlain didn't prescribe prednisone until 1999. 
11 A. You know, of all these doctors' reports that I 
12 reviewed, in some of them there may have been some 
13 contradiction. I know that she received prednisone early in 
14 1999 as a consequence, I think, of an operative procedure 
15 that may have been at the end of 1998. Maybe that's what I 
16 meant. 
17 I know that there was an initial treatment with I 
18 prednisone at extremely low doses that was felt to be very ' 
19 effective in relieving her symptoms. This somehow was later 
20 misinterpreted as a reason to continue treating with 
21 prednisone at much higher doses. I 
22 It was, I think in September of 1998, that the 
23 patient had some fascial surgery, and sometime after that 
24 surgery, she developed severe leg pain, she couldn't stand, 
25 so she went back to the hospital and she was found to have a 
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1 condition called rhabdomyolysis. And at least in one of the 
2 reports here ~ although 1 never found primary evidence for 
3 that in the record, that is, a report from that time -- said 
4 that she was treated with prednisone at that time for an 
5 elevated sed rate and a high CPK, that's a creatinine 
6 phosphokinase muscle enzyme, and that she responded and got 
7 well. So it could have been an error, but one of the 
8 consultants here dated it to 1998. 
9 Q. Thank you. Now, you indicated that the short course 
10 of treatment in early 1999 seemed to help, and I think you 
11 said it was misinterpreted as providing grounds for her going 
12 back on the steroids. 
13 A. Because later on I saw that kind of use as 
14 justification for the diagnosis and for treatment of 
15 steroids, but in truth, she was on 10 or 20 milligrams, 
16 extremely low doses. 
17 Q. Initially? 
18 A. Right. And was actually given some IV fluids during 
19 that course of rhabdomyolysis, which really is what made her 
20 better. 
21 Q. The IV fluids? 
22 A. Right, which is the real ideal treatment for rhabdo. 
23 And the physician who followed her then may have even 
24 suggested that she had a myositis. Again, that's a more 
25 general term. Because myositis could be a phenomenon 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Miinson v. wnamDericti i i , m.i*. 
Page 33 
1 attributable to rhabdomyolysis, which is kind of a pressure 
2 destruction of muscle. 
3 Q. What causes the rhabdomyolysis? 
4 A. Pressure. If you put enough pressure on a muscle 
5 for long enough it starts to disintegrate. 
6 Q. Would that be the pressure of lying on the operating 
7 table during the fascial revision or more internal pressure 
8 from the inflammation? 
9 A. No. It's usually external pressure. In fact, the 
10 most common cause of rhabdomyolysis in my practice, and 
11 probably in internal medicine, are elderly people who fall 
12 and can't get up and someone doesn't come to check on them 
13 for hours or days. In many cases it's fatal. They develop a 
14 rip-roaring rhabdomyolysis with CPKs in the thousands. If 
15 the kidney can't clear the myoglobin, the muscle proteins 
16 that are released in these dead muscles, they go into renal J 
17 shutdown and they can die. 
18 Generally healthy people, a, could tolerate that 
19 load of myoglobin, but b, are rarely found to be incapable of | 
20 getting up after falling even with a broken leg or something, I 
21 and even without attention or help from other people. They 
22 can usually drag themselves to get to a phone or something. 
23 So rhabdomyolysis is generally caused by external pressure 
24 that destroys muscle cells. 
25 Q. The preferred treatment for that is hydration? 
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1 A. Well, you have to stop the offending agent and get 
2 them off their muscle and help their body. It's kind of 
3 really supportive care. You can't do anything about the 
4 muscles that have already been damaged. So mostly you 
5 support them. If they are having renal shutdown, you have to 
6 dialyze them. You give them lots of fluids to wash out the 
7 myoglobin. If they develop hypotension, you support them 
8 with fluids. If they develop cardiac dysrhythmias, you have 
9 to give them something to regulate their heart rate. 
10 Q. You indicated earlier when you were discussing the 
11 patients that you had treated with polymyositis that if they 
12 feel better you taper the steroids, and if they come in and 
13 their symptoms have worsened, you might bump it up a little. 
14 A. Right. 
15 Q. I am curious how that plays in with your statement 
16 that Rebekah Munson's initial good response to the steroid 
17 treatment - that coming back and treating it with steroids 
18 was inappropriate? 
19 A. Well, my feeling is based upon the fact that that 
20 initial treatment with steroids was too low a dose to do 
21 anything. 
22 Q. 10 to 20 milligrams a day? 
23 A. Right. 10 milligrams a day-you know, your own 
24 body makes the equivalent of about 5 or 7 milligrams a day. 
25 The minute you get that much or more, your body stops making 
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1 its own, and that's why you have to taper. That's why you 
2 can't stop prednisone suddenly. Because if you stop suddenly 
3 and your own adrenal gland hasn't awakened to start producing 
4 its baseline amount, you will end up in an Addisonian crisis. 
5 You will have no steroids at all. That in itself can be 
6 fatal. i 
7 Q. Did you say "Addisonian"? 
8 A. Right. So the point is that the initiation of 
9 exogenous steroid treatment generally suppresses the adrenal 
10 gland from making its own prednisone equivalent. So that's ! 
11 why 10 milligrams a day, or 20, it's not really enough for a 
12 patient who has polymyositis. In fact, if you didn't get a 
13 good response and had good evidence for a diagnosis, which 
14 was missing here all along - but if you had good evidence 
15 for a diagnosis and they didn't respond to 10 milligrams or 
16 20, you would be obligated to go to 40 or 60 or 80 a day. 
17 But as soon as you get no response to that after a 
18 couple of weeks or when the side effects outweigh the 
19 benefits, you've got to rethink things and say, Hey, this 
20 isn't polymyositis. This is something else. Let's go back 
21 to the drawing board. 
22 Q. But in this case where they started at the low dose 
23 and seemed to have a good response, when her symptoms 
24 worsened, why was it improper, then, to try a little higher 
25 dose? 
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1 A. Because the fact that she responded to such a low 
2 dose is probably not an indication of treating the proper 
3 disease. That's just the first factor. The second factor is 
4 that prednisone even at low doses can mask symptoms. 
5 Prednisone is a medication that's fraught with so many 
6 complications that if you know anything as a physician, you 
7 have to know that you better be certain about what you are 
8 treating and why you are treating it. In fact, we are 
9 obligated now to give a patient a disclaimer or an 
10 informed-consent form that lists like 14 or 16 different 
11 horrible things that can happen if they are taking prednisone 
12 to make sure that they understand they are willing to take 
13 that risk. 
14 This is when you know about the diagnosis. When you 
15 don't know about it, you are much less likely to try this. 
16 That's why nowadays since we live in such a litigious 
17 society, a lot of internal medicine specialists make the 
18 diagnosis and refer the patient to a rheumatologist. 
19 MS. SHERMAN: Could you read the first few sentences 
20 of his response. 
21 THE DEPONENT: I think the first response was that 
22 when the dose is too low, you can't depend upon it telling 
23 you something. The second part was that it may mask things 
24 and so it gives you a false sense of security, and the third 
25 thing is that because the complications are so severe, you 
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1 have to be very certain about your diagnosis when you start 
2 pushing big doses. 
3 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) Thank you. So when you said 
4 initially when the dose is so low you can't rely on it 
5 telling you something, to what then do you attribute her 
6 initial favorable response? 
7 A. Time. Things like muscle aches get better, rhabdo 
8 improves. You get rid of fluids, you get rid of the 
9 myoglobin, the muscle heals and she is back to normal. 
10 Q. So do you agree with the initial assessment of 
11 rhabdomyolysis? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Is it in any way significant to your opinion of 
14 Dr. Chamberlain's care that he had referred Ms. Munson to a 
15 rheumatologist in March of '99, and that she didn't want to 
16 follow up on that because of concerns about money and driving 
17 the distance from Provo to Salt Lake? 
18 A. What's the question? 
19 Q. Is it significant to your opinion — you mentioned 
20 that one thing that would be important would be to refer the 
21 patient to a rheumatologist. And, in fact, Dr. Chamberlain 
22 did refer Ms. Munson to a rheumatologist in March. 
23 A. Well, yes, it is significant to my opinion. 
24 Q. In what way? 
25 A. A, the fact that a patient refused to see a 
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1 specialist is not reason to go ahead and start treating her 
2 as though she has that disease without the benefit of special 
3 consultation. B, if money is an issue and she can't afford 
4 either the travel or the care she is going to get, there are 
5 resources in every state and in every city to help take care 
6 of patients like this. There is a state hospital, there is a 
7 city hospital, and because this is an interesting case, the 
8 university will take teaching patients at no charge; they 
9 will allow the students to learn something from it. 
10 In this day and age it's not an excuse to give the 
11 patient the wrong medication and cause side effects because 
12 they can't afford to see a consultant or don't have time to 
13 drive to see a consultant. 
14 Q. Did you have a "C" for that list? I think you had 
15 initially indicated you had three points on that. 
16 A. What was my first point? 
17 (The last answer was read back as follows: "A, the 
18 fact that a patient refused to see a specialist is not reason 
19 to go ahead and start treating her as though she has that 
20 disease without the benefit of special consultation.") 
21 THE DEPONENT: And thirdly, I guess an acceptable 
22 approach is to say, Look, you don't want to see this 
23 consultant I selected for you, you can't afford to see a 
24 different consultant, let's sit down and discuss what we can 
25 do. I can start putting you on medications that I think are 
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1 appropriate. I'm not sure about the diagnosis, that's why I 
2 want you to see a rheumatologist. 
3 In fact, when she saw this rheumatologist the first 
4 time, as I recall, his opinion was that she did not have 
5 polymyositis. She didn't meet the criteria. Now, the fact 
6 that she doesn't want to go back and confirm that opinion is 
7 something that Dr. Chamberlain has to deal with. But one of 
8 the ways to deal with it is, Look, you don't want to go back 
9 and see him, you don't want to get confirmation of this 
10 disease, here is my feeling. You are willing to come and see 
11 me, perhaps I'll even see you free of charge ~ I mean, I 
12 don't know what rates he had — but I'm going to start you on 
13 medication that has some pretty significant side effects. If 
14 I'm right, you are going to feel great. If I'm wrong, it may 
15 not make you feel better, but you nevertheless may suffer 
16 some consequences. Do you agree on embarking on this kind of 
17 a course? And if she says, Yes, 1 do, let's go ahead and try 
18 it, that's the third option. That's a thing you can do. 
19 Now, again, in this day and age, that's not something that 
20 very many doctors either have the time, the willingness or 
21 the patient cooperation to be able to do it. 
22 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) Is it your understanding that 
23 Dr. Chamberlain did not have any such conversation with Ms. 
24 Munson? 
25 A. I reviewed his notes and his records and I didn't 
Page 40 
1 see any such thing. In fact, even the most basic of informed 
2 consents for taking prednisone, I didn't see any such form in 
3 the records. 
4 Q. You mentioned that some internal medicine physicians 
5 are giving detailed written consent forms for the use of 
6 prednisone or other steroids. 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. In your opinion, is that the standard of care now 
9 for a physician to use a form such as that? 
10 A. I know that in this state the malpractice carriers 
11 are saying it is. They have gone so far as to design such an 
12 informed consent. I know that rheumatologists use it and I 
13 know that most internists that I deal with and have gone to 
14 school with and have trained with do something like that. If 
15 they don't actually have them sign the form, which I do. they 
16 at least put in their notes, I have gone over this form with 
17 the patient and he or she agrees, and then maybe even put a 
18 copy of such a form in the chart so that there is some record 
19 later on that this was done because we are operating in an 
20 arena where if it's not recorded, it wasn't done. That may 
21 or may not be true, but that's the standard on which we are 
22 judged. 
23 Q. So in Colorado, it's approaching a standard of care 
24 to use that form? 
25 A. I think so. I think if you asked a rheumatologist, 
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1 Do you always do that? They'd say, Yes. If you ask an 
2 internist, Do you always caution a patient about steroids? 
3 They would say, Yes. You would say, Prove it; show me in 
4 your chart where you said you told the patient. At least get I 
5 the patient to agree you told the patient. 
6 Q. Do you know if using such a form is the standard of 
7 care in Utah? 
8 A. I do not know. I know, for example, however, that 
9 the standard in Utah is to caution every patient about every 
10 drug you give them and its potential side effects because 
11 that's the standard in the whole country. 
12 Q. You mentioned towards the end of paragraph 1 that 
13 Ms. Munson, when she saw Dr. Gremillion, he tapered her off' 
14 of steroids and replaced it with methotrexate, a 
15 nonsteroidal. 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Is the methotrexate a good prescription in your 
18 opinion? 
19 A. It all depends. I think Dr. Gremillion, if I am not 
20 mistaken, he was operating under the diagnosis of an 
21 ankylosing spondylitis. Methotrexate, actually, when used 
22 judiciously as a cytotoxic drug, is in many ways safer than 
23 prednisone. 
24 Now, when you use it at chemotherapy levels, that's 
25 not true. Methotrexate has a number of different 
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1 indications. When it's used in rheumatologic diseases, which 
2 both polymyositis and ankylosing spondylitis can be placed, 
3 methotrexate is sometimes safer than even nonsteroidal. Most 
4 rheumatoid arthritis patients have just done beautifully with 
5 the cytotoxic drugs. I hate the use of the word "cytotoxic." 
6 That in itself is scary for patients. But basically what you 
7 are doing is you are inhibiting the cells in the blood that 
8 are responsible for the inflammation from doing their job. 
9 Now, there are certain precautions you have to take. 
10 You have to make sure that the platelets don't go too low, 
11 that the white cells don't go too low, that their lymphocytes 
12 don't go too low, that the hematocrit stays normal. It's not 
13 always so simple. But if you can manage that and give them 
14 methotrexate, they have phenomenal responses, and you can 
15 actually have reversal of certain, you know, deformities 
16 caused by the rheumatologic disease. 
17 Q. We have been going about an hour. Do you want to 
18 take a quick break? 
19 A. I think that's a good idea. 
20 (Recess taken.) 
21 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) Returning to your expert witness 
22 report dated June 5 or June 17, in paragraph 2 you mention 
23 that the muscle biopsy on Rebekah Munson was negative, 
24 showing no evidence of myositis. The EMG is completely 
25 negative. No evidence of myopathy or neuropathy. Is it your 
1 opinion that the polymyositis - strike that. Let me just 
2 skip over that paragraph. I already covered some of this. 
3 In paragraph 6, you state that Dr. Gremillion diagnosed 
4 Ms. Munson with spondylitis. Is that the same as the 
5 ankylosing spondylitis that you mentioned? I 
6 A. Yes. I 
7 Q. Is it your opinion that that is what Ms. Munson 
8 actually had, or can you tell? 
9 A. I can't tell, you know. But Dr. Gremillion makes a 
10 very cogent case for it. Even so, she is an exception to the 
11 rule. She is what we call seronegative ankylosing 
12 spondylitis. But a certain percentage of the population, as 
13 high as 10 percent, are seronegative. 
14 Q. What does that mean? 
15 A. Ankylosing spondylitis is a disease that has a very 
16 high association with a genetic marker. One of the genetic 
17 markers we use in blood typing is an HLA B-27 categorization. 
18 And patients with ankylosing spondylitis, the vast majority 
19 of them, have this genetic predisposition. For a long time 
20 it was felt it was a genetic disease because of it, although 
21 we have now found that there are some markers without the 
22 disease, so it's not a one-to-one relationship. 
23 The theory is that you need this marker as a 
24 predisposition and then something else, maybe a viral 
25 infection or maybe — it takes more than just the marker. 
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1 But the marker certainly makes you predisposed. She doesn't 
2 have the marker. Not everyone does. But she has the very, 
3 very strong correlative radiographic findings of closing of 
4 the sacroiliac joints. 
5 Q. That's the hallmark of ankylosing spondylitis? 
6 A. There is one hallmark that's even more likely, more 
7 predictive of the disease, but that happens must later in 
8 life, so she may develop it years from now. 
9 Q. What is that other element? 
10 A. It's a fusion of the different vertebral bodies to 
11 the point where the entire spinal column starts looking like 
12 one gigantic long rod and you lose all the mobility in your 
13 back because of it. That's only a small problem because you 
14 don't use that joint. Only under pathological conditions is 
15 there movement there. It's kind of a frozen joint. But when 
16 the joint obliterates, it means that the joint is closing. 
17 When the joint starts closing between the lower lumbar 
18 vertebral bodies one by one by one, pretty soon you have 
19 basically a ramrod spine and you can't turn and you can't 
20 walk. 
21 Q. That reminds me to sit up straighter. 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Touching on your conclusions regarding the standard 
24 of care, you say that the standard of care was breached by 
25 Dr. Richard Chamberlain for the following reasons: 
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1 Prednisone therapeutic trial should last a week, two weeks or 
2 at the most three weeks. Now, I thought you had stated 
3 earlier that in some cases it can go on for years. So could 
4 you explain the parameters of those two statements. 
5 A. Of course. Can 1 first just ask where you were 
6 reading that? 
7 Q. Yes. Page 2, although these pages aren't numbered. 
8 A. What number? 
9 Q. Number 1 midway through the page. 
10 A. See, now here it's talking about a therapeutic 
11 trial. A therapeutic trial means we are not sure about the 
12 diagnosis and we have doubts, so we are going to give you a 
13 medicine that isn't so much the conclusive treatment for what 
14 you have, but a trial. In other words, we are going to try 
15 you on it and see if you get better. If you get better, 
16 great, then we'll continue to monitor for possible other 
17 diagnoses and, of course, for side effects, which you always 
18 do, but at least we are going to forge on with the treatment 
19 since it's helping. 
20 But if you don't improve, and certainly if you 
21 develop side effects from the treatment, we are going to back 
22 off and go back to the drawing board. 
23 Q. So do you consider in this case the therapeutic 
24 trial was the initial prescription of steroids in January, or 
25 are you looking at when she resumed taking the steroids? 
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1 A. When she resumed taking the steroids. As I 
2 mentioned before in the deposition, I don't think that 
3 10 milligrams of prednisone or even 20 is really much of a 
4 therapeutic trial. It's certainly not a diagnostic trial. 
5 Q. Because it was a low dose? 
6 A. It's too low a dose. You know, if I said, Well, 
7 take this migraine drug, but take 100th of the normal dose 
8 and you get better, is it because of that dose? You probably 
9 just got better without it. It's not much of a therapeutic 
10 or a diagnostic trial when you don't give an adequate dose. 
11 Q. So other than saying that that January course of 
12 steroids was lower than you would expect would show results, 
13 do you have any criticism of his prescribing steroids as he 
14 did in January? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. What is that criticism or criticisms? 
17 A. There is no evidence in the record that she was 
18 given any kind of an informed consent. There is no record — 
19 there is no evidence in the record that she was cautioned 
20 about the potential harmful side effects. There is no 
21 evidence in the record that she was told that this diagnosis 
22 is questionable. I take issue with even giving 10 to 
23 20 milligrams under those circumstances. 
24 Q. You state that if there is no improvement, one must 
25 challenge and question the diagnosis and certainly the 
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1 treatment. 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. What should Dr. Chamberlain have done? 
4 A. He should have said, Look, the only reason we put 
5 you on these drugs is because you refused to go back to the 
6 specialist. We still don't have a firm diagnosis. All the 
7 criteria, the EMG is negative, the muscle biopsy is negative, 
8 the clinical improvement we expected hasn't occurred, and you 
9 are suffering all these side effects. Let's get you off the 
10 prednisone. Once you are off the prednisone we will recheck. 
11 We will do another diagnostic workup, and let's find out what 
12 you are getting. If I fail to be able to come up with a good 
13 diagnostic working hypothesis, please let me refer you to a 
14 rheumatologist. 
15 You know, ultimately that's what she did anyway, but 
16 she could have been saved a whole year's worth of problems 
17 and an extra 100 pounds of weight and this cushingoid 
18 appearance and high blood sugars and gallbladder disease and 
19 continuous yeast vaginitis. I mean, all of these things are 
20 a consequence of her steroids, and I am sure that she's aware 
21 of that. 
22 Q. So is it your understanding that she gained 
23 100 pounds during her treatment with steroids? 
24 A. Well, during that year she gained nearly 100 pounds. 
25 She went from the 250 range to the 350 range or 330 range. I 
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1 have it in those records that you currently have that are 
2 being photocopied. She gained a tremendous amount of weight. 
3 Q. Do you know if she had any prior history of having 
4 vaginitis, the yeast infections? 
5 A. Almost everyone has a history of yeast vaginitis at 
6 one point or another, but she apparently developed such 
7 severe problems that Dr. Chamberlain sent her to an OB/GYN 
8 consultant, and apparently that she could afford. 
9 Q. Have you seen her medical records predating her 
10 treatment with Dr. Chamberlain? 
11 A. No, but his note I think implied that this was more 
12 than just a simple vaginitis and that it was continuous. In 
13 fact, the consultant said, I'm considering maybe she has 
14 diabetes to create this much of a problem because diabetics 
15 are very prone to yeast vaginitis. The only thing he didn't 
16 say is, Hey, it may be all these steroids, which he didn't 
17 even mention as one of her medications, because that's the 
18 other most common cause. 
19 Q. Who didn't mention it, the consultant? 
20 A. The consultant. He's looking for a reason why she 
21 should have such a severe problem with vaginitis. And so he 
22 said, I'll work her up for diabetes. I never saw whether or 
23 not he did or what the results were. I know that there were 
24 a number of blood sugars that were in the diabetic range and 
25 a number of other blood sugars that were pretty normal. I 
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1 wasn't able to correlate when the blood sugar was done with 
2 what her course of steroids was, but that's, of course, 
3 probably one of the most common causes of transient 
4 diabetes ~ I think next to pregnancy — is prednisone 
5 treatment. 
6 Q. To some degree Dr. Chamberlain's treatment tracked 
7 Ms. Munson's CPK and sed rate. What's your opinion of using 
8 that as a marker to tailor this -
9 A. It's hard to because prednisone — it will 
10 artificially lower the sedimentation rate even when the 
11 degree of inflammation may not be lowered. It will mask it. 
12 That's why it was implied before. Sometimes once you have a 
13 patient on steroids, particularly at 40 milligrams, 
14 60 milligrams, you are masking some of these markers. 
15 Now, the nice thing is that usually the patient is 
16 getting better clinically and the sed rate is going down. So 
17 you have two pieces of evidence. But when those two aren't 
18 concordant and when you have a sedimentation rate that's 
19 rising and a patient is feeling better, watch out, because 
20 you still could be barking up the wrong tree. When you have 
21 a sedimentation rate that's coming down and the patient is 
22 getting worse clinically, watch out because all you are doing 
23 is artificially suppressing the sed rate and they are not 
24 doing well. 
25 The times when it really helps you is when they are j 
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1 both getting better or when they are both getting worse. If 
2 that's the case, what is the use of the sed rate, 
3 particularly when you understand that a sedimentation rate, 
4 although a very sensitive test, is an extremely nonspecific 
5 test. 
6 So her sed rate could have been up because of 
7 ankylosing spondylitis. It could have been up because of the 
8 dermabrasion. It could have been up because of 
9 osteoarthritis of the knee. It could have been up because of 
10 increasing vaginitis. It could have been up because she is 
11 really heavy even before this all started. 
12 So the sed rate is the last thing that you're really 
13 going to rely on and put all your eggs on. Those are not the 
14 eggs you want to put in one basket, particularly when the 
15 range in the sed rate is so small. I mean, there was a point 
16 when she was already on 40, and 1 thought, We are going on 
17 the right path. She is down on her prednisone. Her sed rate 
18 goes to 28 and he says, Oops, it went up to 28. Let's jump 
19 to 60 milligrams. That almost shocked me when I read it. 
20 That's the last thing you would do. 
21 Then the CPK. Following the CPK is not so simple 
22 either. CPK or the creatinine phosphokinase, a muscle 
23 enzyme, in people as heavy as she is, even before she gained 
24 nearly 100 pounds, is not as reliable a marker. People that 
25 have rhabdomyolysis - she has already demonstrated that her 
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1 muscles are susceptible to releasing enzymes. So CPK doesn't 
2 help you, plus all the other enzymes that go up with 
3 polymyositis were not up. She didn't have an elevated SGOT, 
4 SGDT, LDH. I think there is only one time when an aldolase 
5 was normal. Aldolase is a little bit more specific because 
6 CPK is elevated from three different sources. It's not just 
7 muscle. 
8 Q. What are the other two? 
9 A. Well, one of the places CPK is found in very high 
10 concentrations is the brain. So the brain can raise CPK. 
11 And in addition to the skeletomuscles, which we are dealing 
12 with here, CPK is found in smooth muscle. Smooth muscle is 
13 skeletomuscles, like involuntary muscles. 
14 Q. Like intestines? 
15 A. The intestines, the heart. In fact, when we 
16 routinely assess a patient for a heart attack, we fractionate 
17 the CPK. If the CPK is very high, you don't say, Yep, the 
18 patient is having a heart attack, because it could have come 
19 from his skeletomuscles, his biceps, his triceps, his quads 
20 or his brain or from the heart. 
21 So you want to — and there is a way to separate the 
22 CPK to three fractions. Is it the heart fraction that's way 
23 up? Ah, they are having a heart attack. This was the gold 
24 standard enzyme before troponins were discovered. Troponins 
25 are just recently discovered, which means as I get older, 
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1 "recent" means the past six or seven years. Before that we 
2 didn't have troponins and we relied on CPK for diagnosing a 
3 heart attack. 
4 Q. Do you know if the CPK was fractionated in this 
5 case? 
6 A. It was never fractionated. And people like 
7 Ms. Munson, they can have a kind of high CPK just from the 
8 stress that their muscles are taking because of weight. We 
9 know that it's unlikely for somebody her age and just about 
10 her fascial plastic surgery to have such a high CPK. She has 
11 some susceptibility in her muscles from the recent high 
12 enzymes, so that becomes an unreliable monitor of how you ard 
13 doing. Plus the labs for CPK normals vary like crazy. And 
14 so what you call high CPK one day is not high the next 
15 because of the lack of transient parameters. 
16 Except for that one time when she has the rhabdo, 
17 she had very, very minimal CPK elevations, if any. Most of 
18 them were within the normal range. And CPK, again, is 
19 affected by prednisone. So prednisone has this kind of 
20 paradoxical effect on CPK. Even though it can cause a 
21 myopathy ~ prednisone itself can cause muscle symptoms 
22 similar to what she has got. It still will reduce the CPK to 
23 the extent where you say, Hmm, the enzymes are getting 
24 better. 
25 You can't measure the enzymes and determine how well 
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1 you are doing with polymyositis. 90 percent of it really 
2 depends upon - and this is when you have a firm diagnosis. 
3 90 percent of it depends upon the clinical response. It's 
4 not so hard because in polymyositis it isn't just subjective. 
5 "Clinical" doesn't mean just subjective. How are you feeling 
6 today? Oh, terrible. Why? Because my girlfriend and I had 
7 a fight. It's not how you are feeling. It's, How do you 
8 feel to me? You actually squeeze muscles. You touch 
9 muscles. You examine muscles. These muscles are abnormal. 
10 You feel your own muscle and you feel a patient's muscle with, 
11 polymyositis and say, Wow, there is a difference. The muscle 
12 is red, it's warm, and sometimes it's hot to the touch. It \ 
13 hurts like the dickens. It has a different consistency. i 
14 Q. Do they get hard? 
15 A. Sometimes they get soft and sometimes they get hard. 
16 Earlier in the course of the disease, actually sometimes they 
17 are quite soft because they are inflamed. I 
18 Q. I know at one point she had complained of her 
19 muscles being hard to the touch. 
20 A. The problem with hard is that muscle spasm feels 
21 hard. A charley horse makes it feel hard. You can't really 
22 hang your diagnosis on that, but a charley horse would never 
23 feel warm to the touch, like inflamed, and a charley horse 
24 actually feels better if you squeeze it. Polymyositis, it 
25 hurts like the dickens when you squeeze it. 
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1 One of my patients with active polymyositis started 
2 missing appointments because she said, It just hurts too much 
3 when you examine my muscles. And as gentle as you try and 
4 be, it actually hurts them. She had a big problem with 
5 marital relations because her muscles just hurt too much, so 
6 I had to have a conference with her and her husband and 
7 explain, Hey, this isn't because she doesn't love you 
8 anymore, this is because it's part of her disease process. 
9 MR. PARKINSON: Counsel, while he was going through 
10 his discussion, there was someone who brought in select 
11 copies. Are we going to mark that as an exhibit? 
12 MS. SHERMAN: Yes. I need to get other copies made, 
13 so when we take another break, I'll have them make a copy for 
14 you. 
15 MR. PARKINSON: Some of those documents I haven't 
16 seen myself, so if we make it an exhibit, I don't really 
17 care. You don't have to make a separate copy for me if we're 
18 going to make it an exhibit. I have no problem with that. 
19 Otherwise, 1 would like copies. 
20 MS. SHERMAN: All right. 
21 MR. PARKINSON: Thanks. 
22 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) Again, looking at the second half 
23 of page 2 of your opinion, the paragraph numbered 2, it's the 
24 second paragraph numbered 2 on that page, it says, "Informed 
25 Consent. Rebekah Munson was not told of tenuous situation of 
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1 the diagnosis and the possible outcome of prednisone 
2 treatment at high doses." Again, your understanding that she 
3 wasn't told about these comes from the absence of information 
4 in the medical records that you've seen? 
5 A. Right. 
6 Q. I understand you haven't reviewed Dr. Chamberlain's 
7 deposition testimony, but that Mr. Parkinson told you a 
8 little bit about it at lunch today. 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Did he give you any information about the consent or 
11 Dr. Chamberlain's testimony about consent? 
12 A. He just kind of briefly mentioned in passing that 
13 Dr. Chamberlain says, Yes, he warned her, and that the 
14 patient says, No, he didn't. 
15 Q. When you mention the "tenuous situation" of the 
16 diagnosis, is that what you referred to earlier in terms of 
17 telling the patient explicitly, you know, We're working with 
18 this diagnosis but we are not certain of it? 
19 A. In fact, the form was critical criteria for the 
20 diagnosis, the clinical presentation. The absence of a 
21 positive EMG, a normal biopsy, and the lack of appropriate 
22 enzyme elevation. 
23 Q. The normal biopsy, you said? 
24 A. Right. Normal muscle biopsy. 
25 Q. It seems like the biopsy needed to have been of a 
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1 proximal muscle? 
2 A. Well, because polymyositis is a disease mostly 
3 affecting proximal muscles, you would think that's where you 
4 go for the biopsy. But the truth is, since it has "skip" 
5 areas, you go where the symptoms are. And I'm assuming they 
6 biopsied where her symptoms are; otherwise, why didn't they 
7 just do a hair biopsy? It's a lot less painful. 
8 Q. So the fact that it was a normal biopsy when they 
9 did it — my understanding is the biopsy was of a distal 
10 muscle rather than a proximal muscle? 
11 A. It was her calf as opposed to her thigh or her 
12 hamstring. 
13 Q. So distal is further from the trunk and proximal is 
14 closer? 
15 A. Right. 
16 Q. It's also my understanding that they did it in the 
17 calf because that's where she claimed that it hurt. In those 
18 circumstances where the biopsy was distal but normal, does 
19 that rule out satisfaction of that one clinical element? 
20 A. Correct. You can't base your diagnosis on a 
21 negative biopsy. It's true if we're looking for cancer of 
22 the colon we biopsy it. If we biopsy the wrong place, you 
23 don't say, Okay, you've got it; you've got cancer ~ because 
24 we biopsied the wrong place. 
25 Q. But in polymyositis, the biopsy would show -- what 
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1 would it show? 
2 A. If it were positive? 
3 Q. Yes. 
4 A. It would show the infiltration of white blood cells, 
5 primarily lymphocytes. It would show polymorphonuclear cells 
6 as well. It would show swelling of the membranes, the 
7 vessels and the muscles. It would show the muscle actually 
8 thickened and edematous with fluid. It would show some 
9 muscle cells in the state of complete deterioration as though 
10 they are being dissolved. It would show other muscles where 
11 the healing process has tried to take place with some 
12 scarring of connective tissue. 
13 A biopsy is the gold standard for diagnosis of 
14 polymyositis. If for no other reason, it helps you separate 
15 a dozen other diseases that can implicate and simulate 
16 polymyositis. Even muscular dystrophy can look like 
17 polymyositis -- to show you what a severe disease it is. But 
18 the biopsy is the standard answer. 
19 Q. But the fact that the biopsy was negative, standing 
20 alone, doesn't rule out a diagnosis of polymyositis? 
21 A. No, of course not. If you biopsy the wrong place or 
22 even the right place, but you just happen to miss it. Don't 
23 forget muscle biopsies are generally very, very small pieces. 
24 You don't remove a whole muscle to assess it. You have to 
25 hit it right. Your chances improve by going where they hurt, 
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1 and your chances are improved if you have 20 or 30 or 40 
2 biopsies. Obviously your results are going to be much mord 
3 reliable. 
4 The percentage of getting it wrong decreases with 
5 the biopsy, but that's not - you know, patients aren't going 
6 to subject themselves to that kind of abuse. That's why 
7 we have tests like an EMG. An EMG is almost harmless. Ifl 
8 may be a little uncomfortable, but it's certainly not like a 
9 biopsy. And that also is very, very helpful in 
10 differentiating all the things that look like, smell like, 
11 taste like polymyositis, but are not. 
12 Now, if the treatment were Tylenol for both, you 
13 wouldn't even have to subject her to an EMG because it 
14 doesn't matter. The treatment is pretty harmless and it's 
15 the same for it. But when you've got treatment that's 
16 fraught with problems, you want to be certain of the 
17 diagnosis. 
18 1 think my example of cancer is a perfect one. You 
19 would never give somebody chemotherapy before you had a 
20 tissue diagnosis, right? You go through extreme lengths to 
21 do biopsies. You do laparotomies. You open up a patient's 
22 entire gut to look for that cancer before you make the 
23 diagnosis and treat them. 
24 The same thing pertains to polymyositis. You have 
25 got to go to whatever length it takes to confirm that 
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1 diagnosis before you say to this patient, I know you are 
2 going to gain 50, 70, 100 pounds, but it's worth it; 
3 otherwise, you will never get over this disease. And the 
4 patient makes an informed consent. Well, let's see; do I 
5 want to live another ten years and be thin and svelte and 
6 what's considered by society to be beautiful, or do I - it's 
7 either-or. It can't be both - or, Am I willing to take 
8 medications and gain 100 pounds but live another ten years? 
9 Q. The weight gain one gets with steroids, is that 
10 limited to the duration of the course of treatment with the 
11 steroids? Is it possible to lose the weight afterwards? 
12 A. Well, in theory that's true. To some extent that's 
13 what happened with Ms. Munson. After she was taken off the 
14 prednisone, she went back. Now, I think she still weighs in 
15 the 250 range, but she is no longer 330. 
16 Q. Presently, you mean? 
17 A. Yeah. From personal experience, I'll tell you, it's 
18 always easier to gain than to lose. And even when the gain 
19 is artificial or stimulated by some exogenous agent like 
20 prednisone, the fact that, Don't worry, honey, you will lose 
21 all this weight when I get you off prednisone - is not 
22 100 percent. You lose most of it. That weight that was 
23 gained purely because of a fluid buildup, you lose. That's 
24 the weight that was gained because of fat accumulation, and 
25 prednisone causes fat accumulation. It causes your 
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1 metabolism of sugar to change so that you are storing fat 
2 instead of burning fat. 
3 That's what causes diabetes. That's why it causes 
4 elevations in the blood pressure. That's why it causes 
5 myocardial problems. That's why it causes ~ I mean, it has 
6 mineralo and glucocorticoid effects, two separate things that 
7 prednisone does, and those affect in one fashion or another 
8 almost every organ in the body. 
9 Q. What side effects of the prednisone did Ms. Munson 
10 experience in this case? 
11 A. Hypertension; obesity; steatosis was diagnosed, 
12 which is fatty liver infiltration; depression. Some of these 
13 diagnoses notwithstanding were present beforehand, but I 
14 think were aggravated during the course of the treatment, 
15 even by Dr. — well, actually, I don't remember which 
16 physician, but several of the physicians who saw her at that 
17 point stated that there was an aggravation. 
18 Q. At which point? 
19 A. After she was on steroids — after July. I think 
20 Dr. Chamberlain himself stated she had weakness and fatigue, 
21 she had edema, which was swelling from fluid, headaches, 
22 blood sugar - by September of'99,1 think it rose to 121. 
23 By today's definition, that's diabetes. She developed 
24 paresthesias, numbness and tingling in the digits. She 
25 developed frequent infections, both vaginally with yeast, and 
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1 I think she developed a sinus infection too. 
2 In fact, at one point Dr. Chamberlain thought maybe 
3 this whole thing is some deep-rooted infection which we 
4 haven't identified, and he said, Let me put her on some 
5 antibiotics empirically without having a confirmed diagnosis. 
6 But at least with antibiotics, provided you are not allergic, 
7 you take them for ten days and then you are done. So if 
8 there was no infection, you really haven't lost much. It's a 
9 good diagnostic tool. 
10 But he even then said — I think in that note 
11 sometime in - I don't know if it was in March or April. No, 
12 it must have been April. It was sometime in August. I think 
13 he said, If this doesn't make you better, we should seek 
14 consultation. 
15 Getting back to her symptoms, she developed 
16 amenorrhea, she stopped having menstrual periods, and 
17 sometimes steroids at this dose at this length causes 
18 polycystic changes, what we call Syndrome X or dyslipidemia. 
19 I don't know if you are familiar with that. 
20 Q. I am not. 
21 A. It causes weight gain, hypertension, diabetes, 
22 elevated cholesterol and triglycerides. Or recently the 
23 syndrome which leads to coronary artery disease, kidney 
24 failure and strokes has been tied to a disease called 
25 "polycystic ovary disease." And prednisone, things that make 
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1 you gain weight, sometimes cause your ovaries to undergo 
2 polycystic changes. I don't know that she has that. I'm not 
3 saying that she suffered that. 
4 She did have, however, gallbladder disease, which is 
5 a known complication of steroid therapy and obesity, and 
6 cataracts. Now, there was a question whether she had 
7 cataracts or not, but I never saw the final ophthalmologic^ 
8 evaluation. She had heartburn and GI symptoms, dyspepsia and 
9 gastroesophageal reflux disease, which are common even with 
10 low and short-course doses of steroids, but certainly 
11 high-dose, long-course treatment. I think we mentioned 
12 depression. These are all things that I think she had either 
13 de novo or aggravated by steroid treatment. 
14 Q. In paragraph 3, returning to your opinion, you state 
15 that, "Diagnosis of polymyositis was tenuous at best. 
16 Rebekah Munson was not prepared for," and then you list some 
17 of these symptoms that we just discussed — or some of the 
18 side effects, rather, that we just discussed. Is the 
19 criticism of Dr. Chamberlain's treatment expressed in 
20 paragraph 3 sort of a further articulation of your criticism 
21 of his informed consent? 
22 A. Yes. I think there is a — it's more. The informed 
23 consent is simply that he didn't give it to her. Here 1 am 
24 stating that if she were given the option, she might choose 
25 not to go with the treatment. 
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1 Q. That's what you mean by "not prepared"? 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. You mention at the end of paragraph 5 that 
4 Dr. Chamberlain should have considered alternative treatment. 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. What alternative treatment should he have 
7 considered? 
8 A. Voltaren, that's a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory 
9 agent, which she herself told him she felt better on than 
10 with prednisone, but that she couldn't afford it. Now, the 
11 makers of Voltaren - I forgot which pharmaceutical it is -
12 they have a program where they will provide to a patient who 
13 is indigent and needs it free of charge. I don't know if 
14 that was true then. I know it's true now. 
15 Many of the pharmaceuticals have a program where 
16 they will simply at the request of the physician provide the 
17 patient with the drug they need when they can't afford it and 
18 it happens to be the only one in that class that helps them. 
19 So there is an alternative right there. She felt better with 
20 a simple nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agent than she did 
21 with prednisone. There is an alternative. 
22 If the Voltaren wouldn't have sustained her 
23 improvement, I guess I might even — and if he felt strongly 
24 about the diagnosis of polymyositis, and he says, You know, I 
25 don't care what the biopsy shows and what the EMG shows. I 
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1 don't care what the enzymes say, I'm convinced that's what 
2 you've got If you are willing to bear with me on this, I 
3 would like to try you on low-dose methotrexate. That's a 
4 reasonable consideration. I would like to try you on some 
5 sort of behavioral therapies. Let's get you to see a 
6 psychiatrist. Maybe the reason you are not responding to 
7 medication is because you are so upset, and prednisone 
8 aggravates, you know, your psychiatric status. There are so 
9 many other options. 
10 My own personal option just from reviewing this 
11 record is - and I just want to reiterate, I have never seen 
12 this patient except in pictures. 
13 But my own view would have been, Let's stop all your 
14 treatment; let's give your body a chance to heal from all the 
15 damage of the prednisone, and for that matter, the 
16 nonsteroidal anti-inflammatories — because, you know, they 
17 have got mineralo and glucocorticoid effects too; they are 
18 just not as severe as steroids; let's get you off of 
19 everything and see what happens; let's get you in a good diet 
20 and good exercise program. 
21 Because even losing a little bit of weight, even 10 
22 percent of your body, or let's say 5 percent, a 15-pound 
23 weight loss would have made her feel so much better. We knowj 
24 it would have improved her glucose. It would have improved 
25 everything. The strain and stress on her muscles, the ease 
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1 with which her heart functioned, all those things would have 
2 been better. 
3 So my approach would have been, Let's get you off 
4 all these medications because they all have side effects. At 
5 the very least what would have happened then is I think he 
6 would have said to himself, We've still got a problem. She 
7 has still got symptoms. I've gotten her off all of her 
8 medications, but now it's back to being a virgin case. 
9 We have a fresh look. Let's do an HLA B-27. Let's do a sed 
10 rate because we don't have meds that are murking the picture. 
11 Let's now do a CPK, but aldolase. Let's look at her SGOT, 
12 SGDT. Those are technically called liver enzymes, but they 
13 are muscle enzymes as well. Let's do another muscle biopsy. 
14 Let's go proximal this time. Let's repeat the EMG. Maybe 
15 the steroids interfered with the EMG. 
16 If all that fails and I can't come up with a 
17 diagnosis, I am going to talk to my favorite rheumatologist, 
18 who I send a lot of cases and he owes me some favors, and he 
19 is going to see you free of charge. Or let's get my office 
20 manager to help get you Medicaid or some sort of welfare 
21 benefit or somehow to arrange for a payment plan so a 
22 rheumatologist can see you and help me nail down this 
23 diagnosis so I can make you feel better. That's what I would 
24 have done. 
25 Q. In the last paragraph of your opinion you state that 
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1 "Proper treatment in accordance with the standard of care 
2 would almost certainly have led to a correct diagnosis and 
3 proper treatment and would have saved Rebekah Munson from 
4 additional health problems and side effects associated with 
5 prednisone use." When you refer to the additional problems 
6 and side effects, is that in addition to those side effects 
7 listed in paragraph 3 or — 
8 A. It refers mostly to those in 3, but the list I gave 
9 you may have included additional things. I didn't list the 
10 gallbladder problem, I didn't list the cataracts, although I 
11 alluded to visual disturbance. I don't think I listed 
12 gastroesophageal reflux disease. So there are additional 
13 factors, but they are all contained in my answer about what I 
14 think she suffered from as a consequence of prednisone. 
15 Q. She had a - and I always stumble over the 
16 pronunciation of this word. It's the removal of the 
17 gallbladder. 
18 A. Cholecystectomy. 
19 Q. Is it your opinion that that was necessitated by the 
20 steroid treatment? 
21 A. We know that gallbladder disease is affected by 
22 weight and steroids and pregnancy, and part of the reason 
23 it's affected by pregnancy is because of this hormonal shift 
24 of which prednisone takes part as well. So, yes, 1 think so. 
25 I myself have probably had eight or nine cases that 
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1 aggravated and required a gallbladder removal in a patient 
2 who was on steroids. I think it's one of the things we list 
3 on the informed consent, of which I think you probably made a 
4 copy. 
5 Q. Yes, I did. Those informed consents that were in 
6 your file — 
7 A. There were three different ones. 
8 Q. Are those ones that you use in your practice or ones 
9 that you got — 
10 A. I will show you which one 1 use. It's kind of one I 
11 tailor-made and I find most comprehensive. 
12 MR. PARKINSON: I haven't seen those documents. 
13 MS. SHERMAN: I'll get copies made for you after, 
14 Ken, if you would like. 
15 THE DEPONENT: This is the one I have kind of put 
16 together because I think it's the most fair. 1 think from 
17 this the patient will pretty much see what could happen and 
18 allow the patient to make a real reasonable decision. 
19 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) Could you just identify which one 
20 that is. What does it say at the top? 
21 A. It's the one that says "Corticosteroid Consent 
22 Form," and the first line above states, "Because of the 
23 severity of your disease, your physician" — I guess because 
24 I've given this to a number of my compatriots and certainly 
25 my associates in the office, I didn't stick my name on it. 
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1 It says, "your physician feels that the corticosteroids are 
2 indicators and part of your treatment." 
3 Q. Then you have another consent form headed "Patient 
4 Consent For Corticosteroid Therapy." Is this also one that 
5 you prepared or one you received from another source? 
6 A. This one I think came from the risk management 
7 department at Copic Insurance Company. I think that's the 
8 largest Colorado malpractice carrier. I think you will find 
9 a lot of similarities here, as a matter of fact. And the one 
10 that was recommended even years ago but was very, very basic 
11 just says, Look, you can get thinning of the bones and 
12 osteoporosis, fractures; you can get loss of blood to the 
13 bones, which requires surgical correction. 
14 Actually, that's an aseptic necrosis, which is still 
15 a problem today from heavy uses of steroids in asthmatic 
16 patients with use of lots of steroids when they young. High 
17 blood pressure, increased pressure in the eye, that's 
18 glaucoma and cataracts. But nowadays that's probably not 
19 enough. That's the opinion we have from lawyers like you and 
20 you, you know, that we really need to give the patients a 
21 fairer notion of what they can expect with corticosteroid 
22 treatment. 
23 Q. I just have a few more questions to wrap up. I'm 
24 going to refer to some of the allegations that the plaintiff 
25 made in her complaint. As I understand it, you have not 
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1 reviewed the complaint; is that true? 
2 A. I think that's correct, yes. I have not. 
3 Q. The plaintiff contends in her complaint that 
4 Dr. Chamberlain incorrectly diagnosed Ms. Munson's condition. 
5 Do you agree with that statement? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. The plaintiff also contends that Dr. Chamberlain 
8 incorrectly prescribed prednisone considering the plaintiffs 
9 condition. We have discussed that. The plaintiff also 
10 contends that Dr. Chamberlain failed to consider the prior 
11 test that had been performed. 
12 A. I guess that depends on what she is referring to, so 
13 1 can't comment on that. We talked about the testing, the 
14 EMG. We talked about testing of her enzymes and 
15 sedimentation rate. We talked about testing of her muscle 
16 biopsy. If that's what she is referring to, then I would 
17 agree, because those are all strong factors that point away 
18 from the diagnosis of polymyositis. 
19 Q. Do you intend to offer criticisms of anyone else in 
20 this case? 
21 A. I don't know of anyone else in this case. 
22 Q. You mentioned briefly the Rheumatology Primer and 
23 the Harrison's Internal Medicine texts. Can you think of any 
24 other authoritative treatises or publications that one could 
25 refer to? 
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1 A. There are hundreds. 
2 Q. The best among those are the ones you have already 
3 consulted? 
4 A. Well, Harrison's ~ I don't know if I would call it 
5 the best. It's the most standard. It's the bible. It's the 
6 standard volume of medicine for internal medicine. It's the 
7 only book of its kind - it's one of two books of its kind 
8 where it really goes into detail about almost every disease 
9 known to man. The primer is great because it gives you a 
10 focus on the rheumatologic diseases. 
11 Today, in this day and age when I get asked, Well, 
12 what's the best source of information? I say, The Internet. 
13 It's wonderful because it gives you current publications and 
14 it gives you summaries. It gives you a whole idea about the 
15 state of the art, what's going on. And although I have vowed 
16 never to become computer literate, I pretty much have to just 
17 to stay current on some of this stuff, because the computer 
18 has got it on there before it's even published. 
19 Q. Which Internet sources do you rely on? 
20 A. A dozen or more on my favorite sites. 
21 Q. Can you think of— 
22 A. Merck has one, Index Medicus. And, of course, they 
23 cross-reference each other. I mean, I have a whole number of 
24 them, but they will frequently refer to the same sources. So 
25 1 don't know if there is an advantage of having a whole 
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1 bunch. Plus your favorite medical school or hospital 
2 librarian will help you. You call them up and you say, 
3 Please give me all the articles in the past three years on 
4 current developments in any disease. And within a couple of 
5 days you have reams and reams of pages, just summaries, 
6 synopses, and then you read this and say, This is the one I 
7 want to read. Boy, this age of information has made it tough 
8 to remain a good doctor. 
9 Q. There is plenty of information out there. 
10 A. I think too much. 
11 Q. Do you contemplate doing any additional work to 
12 corroborate or test your opinion? 
13 A. Only if asked to do so. By that I mean ~ like, 1 
14 have not reviewed depositions and 1 have not reviewed ~ I 
15 was just handed a piece of paper that - I don't know if it 
16 was like some specialist's opinion that everything in this 
17 case was perfect. 
18 MR. PARKINSON: It's your expert's opinion. 
19 THE DEPONENT: It wasn't even that strong. He just 
20 said, Well, it's okay. It wasn't perfect. So I haven't 
21 reviewed any of that stuff in detail and really hope I don't 
22 get asked to. 
23 Q. (BY MS. SHERMAN) Have you now told me all the bases 
24 for your opinions? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Thank you for coming, Dr. Jacobs. 
2 MR. PARKINSON: I have a statement and then a couple 
3 of brief questions. First, I probably will have him read the 
4 deposition prior to trial, but 1 don't anticipate that that 
5 will change his opinion, but I will probably provide that to 
6 him. 
7 EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. PARKINSON: 
9 Q. If in treating a person who you diagnosis with 
10 polymyositis, if you were dissatisfied with the biopsy 
11 location that was taken, what's the appropriate way to deal 
12 with that problem? 
13 A. Let's repeat the biopsy and do it in an appropriate 
14 place. 
15 Q. You stated that you provided no opinions about the 
16 negligence of Central Utah Medical Clinic. You are not 
17 stating a legal opinion there about whether Central Utah 
18 Medical Clinic has any responsibility for Dr. Chamberlain, 
19 are you? 
20 A. That's correct. I wouldn't be aware of any legal 
21 issue here. 
22 MR. PARKINSON: I have no further questions. 
23 WHEREUPON, the within proceedings were concluded 
24 at the approximate hour of 4:35 p.m. on the 18th day of 
25 November, 2002. 
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1 I, ALEXANDER JACOBS, M.D., do hereby certify that 
2 I have read the above and foregoing deposition and that the 
3 same is a true and accurate transcription of my testimony, 
4 except for attached amendments, if any. 
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otherwise interested in the outcome of this litigation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my signature 
this 5th day of December, 2002. 
My commission expires 4/19/05. 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF COLORADO) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF DENVER ) 
I, Marchelle Hartwig, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public, State of Colorado, do hereby certify that 
previous to the commencement of the examination, the said 
ALEXANDER JACOBS, M.D. was duly sworn by me to testify to the 
truth in relation to the matters in controversy between the 
parties hereto; that the said deposition was taken in machine 
shorthand by me at the time and place aforesaid and was 
thereafter reduced to typewritten form, consisting of 74 
pages herein; that the foregoing is a true transcript of the 
questions asked, testimony given, and proceedings had. 
I further certify that I am not employed by, 
related to, nor counsel for any of the parties herein, nor 
otherwise interested in the outcome of this litigation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my signature 
this 5^ day of December, 2002. 
My commission expires 4/19/05. 
Marchelle Hartwig, CSR /i 
V 
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HUNTER& 
GEISXINC 
Your partner in making the record 
Court Reporting & Video 
December 5, 2002 
ALexander Jacobs, M.D. 
3300 East 17th Avenue 
Denver, Colorado 80206 
Re: Rebekah Munson v. Bruce H. Chamberlain, et al. 
Dear Dr. Jacobs: 
Enclosed you will find a complimentary copy of your 
deposition taken in the above matter. Also enclosed are the 
original signature page and amendment sheets for your 
deposition. 
Please read the transcript, make any corrections on the 
amendment sheets, and sign the signature page and 
amendment sheets before a notary public. After you have read 
and signed your deposition, please forward everything back to 
my office in the enclosed envelope within 30 days from the 
date of this letter. 
Sincerely, i 
Marchelle Hartwig 
HUNTER k GEIST, INC. 
Registered Professional Reporters 
c: Tawni J. Sherman, Esq. 
Kenneth Parkinson, Esq. 
1900 Grant Street, Suite 800 • Denver, Colorado 80203-4308 
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DR- ALEXANDER JACOBS 
EXPERT WITNESS REPORT 
June 5, 2002 
I am a physician practicing internal medicine full time. I am board certified in internal 
medicine. My credentials are set forth in the curriculum vitae attached as Exhibit "B" to my 
report. 
I have reviewed the following medical records pertinent to the care of Rebekah Munson: 
A. Medical records of Dr. Richard Call 
B. Medical records of Dr. Bruce Chamberlain and Central Utah Medical Clinic 
C. Medical records of Dr. Richard Gremillion 
D. Medical records of Dr. Richard Rosenthal 
E. Medical records of Dr. Joseph Watkins 
F. Medical records of Dr. Doug Jones 
G. Medical records from Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for emergency room 
visit of 12/18/98 
The important facts which I have discovered from the medical records and which I have 
used to form my opinions are as follows: 
1. Prednisone was given as early as 1998, post plastic-surgery for a short course. It 
helped temporarily and was then discontinued. Prednisone was reinstated a second time in 
approximately July, 1999 and it did not help even though it was pressed to high doses: 60 mg 
for five months, followed by 50 mg for ten days, followed by 40 mg for another month and by 
January 25, 2000 when Ms. Munson finally sees Dr. Gremillion, he tapers her to 30 mg then 20 
mg and ultimately gets her off Prednisone and replaces treatment with nonsteroidals, 
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methotrexate. 
2. Muscle biopsy performed on March 19, 1999 is negative showing no evidence of 
myositis. EMG is completely negative. No evidence of myopathy or neuropathy. 
3. Dr. Chamberlain questions the diagnosis of polymyositis, indeed putting a ? after 
that term, however, he continues to treat with prednisone. 
4. When the sed rate is 57 on July 19, 1999 and the rest of the labs are normal, Dr. 
Chamberlain states, "lets look for hidden infection", ie: looking for another infection/explanation 
for symptoms, however this is not done. 
5. Dr. Chamberlain opined as early as March 26, 1999, that he might need a 
rheumatologic consultation, however one was not done until January of 2000. After the 
appointment with the rheumatologist the diagnosis was changed and ultimately Prednisone was 
tapered and discontinued. 
6. On February 10, 2000, a diagnosis by Dr. Gremillion is made of spondylitis with 
SI joint inflammation. Subsequently the original symptoms improve. 
The standard of care was breached by Dr. Richard Chamberlain for the following reasons: 
1. Prednisone therapeutic trial should last a week, two weeks or at the most three 
weeks, but if no improvement, one must challenge and question the diagnosis and certainly the 
treatment. 
2. Informed Consent. Rebekah Munson was not told of the tenuous situation of the 
diagnosis and the possible outcome of Prednisone treatment at high doses. 
3. Diagnosis of polymyositis was tenuous at best. Rebekah Munson was not prepared 
for the elevated blood sugar, elevated white count, elevated weight, elevated blood pressure, 
increased depression and dysphoria, yeast infections, headaches, visual symptoms, shortness of 
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breath, edema, heartburn, diarrhea, bruising and polydypsia. 
4. When treatment fails or side-effects become quite profound, prudent rule is to 
consider new diagnosis, new treatment and seek consultation. 
5. Even if Rebekah's diagnosis was such that it required Prednisone, when it failed 
to do much good from a symptomatic standpoint and all of the side-effects were noted, Dr. 
Chamberlain should have considered alternative treatment. 
Proper treatment in accordance with the standard of care would almost certainly have led 
to a correct diagnosis and proper treatment and would have saved Rebekah Munson from 
additional health problems and side-effects associated with Prednisone use. 
DATED this /~7 day of June, 2002. 
ALEXANDER JACOBS, AID., INTERNAL MEDICINE 
J-VKBPUACOBSJLE? 
TOTAL P .05 
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